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PLEADINGS, PROOF, AND JUDGMENT:  
A UNIFIED THEORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION 
Michael S. Pardo* 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent pleadings decisions—Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal—have injected considerable 
chaos into the system of civil litigation. The decisions impose an uncertain 
“plausibility” requirement and appear to endorse an increased power of 
district courts to dismiss complaints—a power that may be employed in an 
unprincipled, normatively problematic manner. The current pleading is-
sues resemble similar issues that have arisen with summary judgment and 
judgment as a matter of law. This Article argues that there has been a sig-
nificant failure at both the doctrinal and theoretical levels to relate these 
three procedural devices to the evidentiary proof process in particular and 
the system of civil litigation as a whole. It introduces a theory of “proce-
dural accuracy” that explains, clarifies, and provides content to the stan-
dards for each device, explains how the theory fits, and explains important 
aspects of the doctrine for each device. Finally, and most importantly, I de-
fend the theory and its standards as normatively desirable in light of pro-
cedural values that underlie the system of civil litigation as a whole. 
Introduction 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly in 20071 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal in 20092 have injected chaos into 
the world of civil litigation.3 The decisions reinterpret the pleading re-
                                                                                                                      
* © 2010, Michael S. Pardo, Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. 
My thanks to Ron Allen, Carol Andrews, Craig Callen, Ed Cheng, Shahar Dillbary, Martin 
Redish, Meredith Render, Michael Risinger, Jason Solomon, Alex Stein, Adam Steinman, 
Suja Thomas, and Fred Vars for their helpful comments on previous drafts or conversa-
tions on these issues. Also, my thanks to Dean Ken Randall and the University of Alabama 
Law School Foundation for generous research support. 
1 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
2 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
3 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 Wis. L. 
Rev. 535, 560 (noting that the “most obvious and immediate consequence” of the new 
pleading standard has been “enormous confusion and transaction costs as a result of un-
certainty about the requirements it imposes and its scope of application”); Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 821, 823 
(2010) (arguing that Bell Atlantic and Iqbal “have destabilized the entire system of civil liti-
gation”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1293 (2010) 
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quirements for civil cases and when complaints may be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim.4 They also invest district courts with the power 
to dismiss complaints prior to discovery based on a failure to be “plau-
sible.”5 The Court’s glosses on a few words in Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 8(a)(2),6 and the uncertainty created by “plausible,” reach to 
the foundation of the system of civil litigation, the goals it is meant to 
achieve, and the values it reflects.7 The disarray created by these deci-
sions has generated a flurry of scholarship from the world of civil pro-
cedure that attempts to explain, interpret, tame, criticize, or justify the 
decisions in light of the deeper goals and values of the system of civil 
litigation.8 These discussions revolve around the fundamental tension 
between the related concerns for access to courts, participation values, 
jury rights, and the risk of eliminating meritorious lawsuits, on one 
hand, and the related concerns for efficiency, in terrorem settlements, 
and meritless lawsuits, on the other hand.9 
                                                                                                                      
(stating that Bell Atlantic and Iqbal “have the potential to upend civil litigation as we know 
it”). 
4 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570. 
5 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 557. 
6 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 554–55. The Court was interpret-
ing the requirement that complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
7 See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal In-
tersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1217, 1225 (2008) 
(“[T]here has been considerable divergence in the normative accounts advanced in the 
scholarly literature regarding judicial regulatory power over pleading norms.”). 
8 See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 849 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Plausibility]; Robert 
G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 873 
(2009) [hereinafter Bone, Pleading Rules]; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3; Scott Dodson, 
Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441 (2010); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 
Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 61 (2007); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Eco-
nomics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 39 (2008); Douglas 
G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1063 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plau-
sibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 431 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility]; A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Spencer, 
Understanding]; Steinman, supra note 3; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: 
The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15 (2010) [herein-
after Thomas, New Summary]; Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitu-
tional, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1851 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas, Motion]; see also generally Sympo-
sium, Pondering Iqbal, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1, 1–309 (2010). 
9 The academic discussions have revolved around what Professor Lonny S. Hoffman 
characterizes as a “traditionalist” position (that Bell Atlantic invests too much power in 
lower courts) and a “reformist” position (that welcomes increased judicial scrutiny over 
complaints). Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1225–26. Much of the academic commentary has 
been critical of Iqbal and Bell Atlantic, but for defenses of those decisions, see Bone, Plead-
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 The chaos and controversies surrounding the pleading require-
ments resemble similar debates about increased use of summary judg-
ment and judgments as a matter of law. As in the pleading context, the 
confusion with these other two procedural devices derives from the 
Court’s adoption of a vague standard based on a few words in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.10 For both devices, the standard is 
whether a “reasonable jury” could find for the nonmoving party.11 And, 
as with pleadings, the controversy revolves around the relationship be-
tween this standard and the power it gives courts to terminate lawsuits 
in light of the underlying tension between values outlined above.12 Sev-
eral scholars have already noted similarities between both the “plausi-
bility” pleading standard and the “reasonable jury” standard and the 
tension between values they each invoke.13 The connections are much 
deeper, however. 
                                                                                                                      
ing Rules, supra note 8, at 879–90; Epstein, supra note 8, at 98–99; Hylton, supra note 8, at 
59–62. But see Bone, Plausibility, supra note 8, at 867–83 (criticizing Iqbal). 
10 With summary judgment, the relevant language is whether “there is no genuine is-
sue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). With judgment as a matter of law, the relevant language is 
whether “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for 
the party.” Id. 50(a)(1). Rule 50 provides for motions for judgment as a matter of law at 
trial, see id. 50(a), and for renewed motions after a jury’s verdict, see id. 50(b). The first 
motion corresponds to a motion for a “directed verdict,” and the second corresponds to a 
motion for “judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” See id. 50(a)–(b). When I use “judg-
ment as a matter of law,” I am referring to both the motion at trial and the renewed mo-
tion after a verdict. 
11 The Court has noted that the “reasonable jury” standards in these contexts “mirror” 
each other. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2000); Arthur R. Miller, The Pre-
trial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés 
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 1134 (2003) 
(“[I]t is imperative that the Supreme Court provide some clarity rather than leaving the 
matter entirely to the general anarchy of trial court discretion.”); Suja A. Thomas, The 
Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 769 (2009) (noting that there is “little 
guidance on how courts are to decide whether a reasonable jury could find for the plain-
tiff”). 
12 See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522, 542 
(2007); Miller, supra note 11, at 1132–34; Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Van-
ishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 1332 (2005); Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 
Rutgers L. Rev. 705, 715 (2007); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: 
Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
81, 96–101 (2006); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 Va. 
L. Rev. 139, 158–60 (2007) (arguing summary judgment is unconstitutional on historical 
grounds). 
13 See generally Epstein, supra note 8; Hylton, supra note 8; Thomas, New Summary, supra 
note 8. 
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 This Article proposes a theory of civil litigation that explains, and 
gives content to, these connections.14 Missing from the discussion re-
garding each of these three procedural devices—pleadings, summary 
judgment, and judgment as a matter of law—is a satisfactory explana-
tion of how each relates to the civil litigation system in general and to 
the evidentiary proof process in particular.15 Understanding how the 
procedural devices relate to the proof process is integral to understand-
ing the standards for each procedural device in light of the underlying 
normative goals and procedural values of civil litigation. This Article 
explains how the content for applying each device necessarily depends 
on the evidentiary rules that structure the process of legal proof. This 
explanation has both descriptive and normative value:16 descriptively, it 
elucidates the functions of the procedural devices; normatively, it pro-
vides criteria for justifying and criticizing possible standards and their 
applications.17 
 Based on these considerations, this Article develops a theory of 
“procedural accuracy” to explain and justify standards for each device. 
The main thesis is that each device functions to align litigation out-
comes with the results that are dictated by the evidentiary proof rules.18 
According to this theory, the proof rules implement important policy 
choices regarding the values underlying the system of civil litigation as a 
whole, including, most importantly, choices about how best to achieve 
accurate outcomes and allocate the risk of adjudicative error.19 Al-
though the procedural devices may either facilitate or frustrate the out-
comes that would arise under the proof rules, this Article argues that 
they ought to facilitate these outcomes. They may do so by aligning 
                                                                                                                      
14See infra notes 132–157 and accompanying text. 
15 Many of the discussions do invoke procedural norms and values underlying civil liti-
gation, but the failure to sufficiently connect these discussions with legal proof makes 
them unsatisfactory both descriptively and normatively. For an article that does discuss the 
recent pleading decisions from an evidentiary perspective, see Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. 
Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence 
and Procedure and the Nature of Rules (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/ronald_allen/3/. 
16 See infra notes 132–157 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 158–202 and accompanying text. On the need for normative theories 
of civil procedure, see Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 
61 Okla. L. Rev. 319, 319 (2008). 
18 See infra notes 158–202 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 158–202 and accompanying text. 
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outcomes with the proof rules;20 those that do are justified, but those 
that do not are normatively problematic.21 
 The Article proceeds in three main Parts.22 Part I outlines the doc-
trine for pleadings, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of 
law, and it explains the problematic standards for each.23 It explains 
that the problems with all three trace to a failure to adequately relate 
the “plausibility” and “reasonable jury” standards to the proof process 
and to the normative considerations underlying this process. 
 Part II presents, in three Sections, the theory of procedural accu-
racy.24 First, it discusses the procedural values underlying civil litigation 
and defines some important terms.25 Most importantly, it defines what 
is meant by “procedural accuracy” (which is contrasted with “material 
accuracy”)—roughly, an outcome is procedurally accurate if it accords 
with the legal proof rules, and an outcome is materially accurate if it 
accords with what actually happened in the events giving rise to the 
lawsuit.26 Next, this Part articulates the theory of procedural accuracy 
and how it relates to the procedural values of civil litigation.27 As men-
tioned above, the main thesis concerns the alignment function of each 
procedural device.28 Finally, this Part explores the content of the theory 
in light of the requirements of the proof rules and articulates standards 
for each device.29 It adopts an explanatory conception of the proof 
rules and provides standards in explanatory terms.30 For example, the 
Article argues that a complaint is “plausible” if it presents an explana-
tion of the relevant events that a reasonable jury may be able to accept 
as the best available explanation.31 Likewise, the Article argues that a 
                                                                                                                      
20 The alignment function must also account for important differences regarding 
where in the litigation process the procedural devices arise. 
21 See infra notes 203–228 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 36–131, 132–228, 229–377 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 36–131 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 132–228 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 132–157 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 132–157 and accompanying text. Neither procedural nor material ac-
curacy implies the other: a decision may be procedurally accurate and materially errone-
ous, and vice versa. The distinction is further explored in Part II. See infra notes 132–228 
and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 158–202 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 158–202 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 203–228 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 203–228 and accompanying text. For discussions of this conception, 
see generally Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1083 (2009); Mi-
chael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 Law & Phil. 223 
(2008). 
31 See infra notes 220–224 and accompanying text. 
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“reasonable jury” could find for a nonmoving plaintiff for purposes of 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law if they could find 
plaintiff’s explanation of the events and the evidence to be better than 
explanations favoring the defendant.32 
 Part III integrates the analysis from Part II into current doctrine 
for pleadings, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law.33 It 
explains how the analysis fits with the doctrine, and it extends and fur-
ther illustrates the analysis by applying the theory to a number of hypo-
thetical examples.34 Finally, Part III considers and responds to a num-
ber of potential counterarguments.35 
I. Three Procedural Devices in Search of a Theory 
 Three procedural devices in civil cases cause considerable confu-
sion: (1) pleading standards;36 (2) summary judgment;37 and (3) judg-
ment as a matter of law.38 The problems with these devices include both 
unclear doctrine, as a descriptive matter, and the lack of a satisfactory 
normative theory that would justify not only the devices in general but 
also the particular doctrine and its applications. This Part briefly dis-
cusses and explains the problematic standards for these devices.39 
A. Pleadings 
 The new pleading regime arising from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly in 2007,40 and Ashcroft v. 
                                                                                                                      
32 See infra notes 223–225 and accompanying text. This assumes the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof under the preponderance rule. See infra notes 223–225 and accompanying 
text. 
33 See infra notes 229–377 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 229–377 and accompanying text. The examples include negligence, 
employment discrimination, antitrust, and municipal liability. See infra notes 229–275 and 
accompanying text. Employment discrimination is explored in some detail in Part III.C. See 
infra notes 369–377 and accompanying text. On problems with the reasonable jury stan-
dard in this context, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimi-
nation Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429, 438–46 (2004); Mi-
chael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 La. L. Rev. 577, 
592 (2001). 
35 See infra notes 229–377 and accompanying text. Many of the counterarguments con-
sidered are suggested by other scholarship and thus situate this analysis within the aca-
demic literature. 
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 12(b)(6). 
37 Id. 56. 
38 Id. 50. 
39 See infra notes 40–131 and accompanying text. 
40 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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Iqbal in 2009,41 introduced considerable uncertainty into civil litiga-
tion.42 Part of the confusion stems from the fact that the recent changes 
did not come from an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rather, the changes stem from a re-interpretation of the familiar 
requirement under Rule 8 that a plaintiff’s complaint must contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief.”43 Failure to satisfy this standard authorizes a court to 
grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state 
a claim on which relief can be granted.”44 The Bell Atlantic and Iqbal de-
cisions are most significant for interpreting Rule 8 to require that a 
complaint’s “statement of the claim” be “plausible.”45 
 Bell Atlantic involved a class action antitrust claim. The plaintiffs, a 
class of subscribers to local telephone and internet services, filed suit 
against four companies that together “allegedly control[led] 90 percent 
or more of the market for local telephone service in the 48 contiguous 
States.”46 The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to re-
strain trade by: (1) inhibiting growth of competing upstart companies 
in their respective areas, and (2) refraining from competing against 
one another in the areas each controlled.47 The success of the claim 
depended on whether the companies had agreed to either of these al-
                                                                                                                      
41 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
42 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 560. 
43 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When alleging fraud or mistake, however, parties must “state 
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Id. 9(b). Rule 8’s mini-
mal requirements express the “liberal ethos” of the federal rules in preferring decisions on 
the merits after full discovery. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 439–40 (1986). Part of the confusion 
also stems from the exceptional factual circumstances of both Bell Atlantic and Iqbal—a 
massive class action (even by class action standards), and a lawsuit against top law en-
forcement officials regarding their conduct after the attacks on September 11, 2001. See 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 548. Despite these circumstances, the 
opinions interpret Rule 8’s general requirements. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atlantic, 
550 U.S. at 557. 
44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). One way in which a complaint would clearly fail to state a 
claim is if the allegations described specific conduct that would not give rise to legal liabil-
ity. See id. 
45 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570. 
46 Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 550 n.1. The companies—BellSouth, Qwest, SBC, and Veri-
zon—are referred to in the opinion as “Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers” (“ILECs”). 
Id. at 550 & n.1. 
47 Id. at 550. 
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leged restraints on trade.48 If the companies had engaged in the con-
duct independently, then there was no liability.49 
 The Court noted that Rule 8 requires plaintiffs to provide “fair no-
tice” of the claim and the “grounds” upon which it rests.50 In construing 
Rule 8’s requirements, the Court rejected the much-cited standard, ar-
ticulated in its 1957 case Conley v. Gibson, that a complaint should be 
dismissed only when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”51 Rather, the Court explained, the complaint must do more than 
merely be consistent with liability; it must “raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level.”52 The Court provided several glosses on what is 
required to satisfy this above-the-speculative-level requirement: (1) 
“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was 
made”;53 (2) “plausible grounds to infer an agreement”;54 (3) “allega-
tions plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement”;55 (4) 
allegations must cross the line “between possibility and plausibility”56 
and (5) the line between “factually neutral” and “factually suggestive”;57 
(6) “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement”;58 and (7) the standard does “not 
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage.”59 
  Under the “plausibility” standard, the complaint failed because it 
alleged only parallel conduct along with a conclusory allegation regard-
ing conspiracy.60 This was insufficient for two reasons. First, although 
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. at 548–49. The plaintiff’s claim, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, required 
proving that the defendants entered into a “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade.” Id. at 548 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)). 
49 See id. at 548–49. 
50 Id. at 555. 
51 Id. at 561–63 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 
52 Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 
53 Id. at 556. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 557. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 557 n.5. 
58 Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556. 
59 Id.; see also id. (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy 
judge that actual proof of [the facts alleged] is improbable . . . .”). 
60 Id. at 564–65. 
[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on de-
scriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of ac-
tual agreement among the ILECs. Although in form a few stray statements 
speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclu-
sions resting on the prior allegations. 
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parallel conduct is consistent with a conspiracy, it does not suggest a con-
spiracy because it is rational for the companies to engage in this behav-
ior, even absent an agreement.61 Moreover, the complaint failed to pro-
vide additional details suggesting that an agreement had been made.62 
 Given the Court’s varying articulations of the standard it estab-
lished in Bell Atlantic, it is no surprise that, after the decision, judges and 
scholars were left scratching their heads.63 Beyond negative glosses—for 
example, that plausibility is not a probability standard, and that it is 
something more than mere consistency with liability—the content of 
“plausibility” was left obscure. 
 The decision in Iqbal did not help matters. In Iqbal, a former prison 
inmate who was detained following the attacks of September 11, 2001 
filed suit against John Ashcroft, the former U.S. Attorney General, 
Robert Mueller, the FBI Director, and other government officials.64 The 
plaintiff, a Pakistani Muslim, alleged that, pursuant to a policy designed 
by the defendants, he was subjected to unconstitutional prison condi-
tions because of his race, religion, or national origin.65 The defendants 
asserted qualified immunity at the district court level and moved to dis-
miss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).66 
 The complaint alleged a constitutional violation based on treat-
ment of the plaintiff while he was detained in a maximum security 
prison unit.67 According to the complaint: (1) the FBI, at the direction 
of Mueller, arrested thousands of Muslim Arab men following Septem-
ber 11; (2) Ashcroft and Mueller approved the policy of keeping the 
detainees in maximum security conditions; (3) Ashcroft and Mueller 
decided to subject the detainees to these conditions because of their 
race, religion, or national origin; (4) Ashcroft was the “principal archi-
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 564 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
61 Id. at 567–68 (“[H]ere we have an obvious alternative explanation . . . a natural ex-
planation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned mo-
nopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.”). 
62 Id. at 549 (characterizing the complaint as “absent some factual context suggesting 
agreement”). 
63 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 537. 
64 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. The opinion involved a motion to dismiss only with regard 
to Ashcroft and Mueller. See id. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 1942–43; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (determining that an implied cause of action existed for an 
individual whose Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures 
was violated by federal agents). 
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tect” of the policy; and (5) Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and 
implementing the policy.68 
 In reviewing the requirements of Rule 8, the Court explained that 
the plaintiff needed to plead a plausible claim that the defendants acted 
with a discriminatory purpose.69 According to the Court, a claim is 
“plausible” when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.”70 The Court further articulated the plausibility 
standard by noting two principles underlying the decision in Bell Atlan-
tic.71 First, courts need not accept “legal conclusions” as true.72 Second, 
putting aside legal conclusions, the complaint must contain enough fac-
tual detail to present a plausible—and not merely a possible—claim.73 
 Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the allega-
tions were not plausible.74 The Court treated the allegation that the 
defendants acted because of race, religion, or national origin as a legal 
conclusion not entitled to be taken as true.75 Although the allegations 
were “consistent” with the defendants acting because of race, religion, 
or national origin, they were not plausible “given more likely explana-
tions.”76 An “obvious alternative” explanation for the treatment plaintiff 
experienced was the “nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who 
were illegally present in the United States and who had potential con-
                                                                                                                      
68 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44. 
69 Id. at 1948 (“Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the 
First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and 
prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”). 
70 Id. at 1949. 
71 See id. at 1949–50. 
72 See id. This “principle” is likely to create confusion going forward because there is 
no principled analytical distinction between “legal conclusions” and “facts.” See Ronald J. 
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1769, 
1769–70 (2003) (explaining that generality, the judge-jury relationship, and conventions 
regarding the meanings of “law” and “fact” each inform whether adjudicative questions 
will be labeled “law” or “fact”). In the pleading context, the difference depends primarily 
on the generality of the allegations—at some point allegations become too general to pre-
sent a plausible account of what happened, but they do not cease to be “factual.” Bell Atlan-
tic and Iqbal illustrate this nicely. Whether the defendants in Bell Atlantic agreed to engage 
in a conspiracy plainly is a question of fact, as is whether the defendants in Iqbal decided to 
house suspects in maximum security conditions because of race, religion, or national ori-
gin. Actions and states of mind are quintessential factual issues. See Bone, Plausibility, supra 
note 8, at 859–62 (noting that “legal conclusions” under Iqbal depend on their generality). 
73 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
74 See id. at 1950–51. 
75 See id. at 1951. 
76 Id. 
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nections to those who committed terrorist acts.”77 Nor did the allega-
tions “show, or even intimate,” that the detainees were held in maxi-
mum security conditions for discriminatory reasons; rather, they sug-
gested only that “the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the af-
termath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected 
terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects 
could be cleared of terrorist activity.”78 
 The primary problems with the new pleading requirements in-
volve uncertainty created by the plausibility standard and, relatedly, the 
lack of guidance to, and constraint on, courts in dismissing com-
plaints.79 Also problematic is how the plausibility standard ought to re-
late to theoretical issues regarding pleadings in particular and the na-
ture of civil litigation in general. A number of recent articles explore 
some of these issues, arriving at different points along a continuum that 
balances access to courts, on one hand, and a concern for screening 
meritless or weak cases early in the process, on the other.80 Although 
these discussions are illuminating, they do not integrate the normative 
considerations with important theoretical issues involving civil litigation 
and the nature of legal proof.81 
B. Summary Judgment 
  Much like difficulties with “plausibility” in the pleading context, the 
summary judgment standard of whether a “reasonable jury” could find 
for the nonmoving party raises difficult interpretive and normative is-
sues.82 Similar to problems in the pleading context, the summary judg-
ment standard fails to provide adequate guidance and constraint with 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1952. This alternative explanation was similar to the alternative explanation of 
independent “parallel conduct” in Bell Atlantic, in which the complaint did not “plausibly 
suggest an illicit accord because it was not only compatible with, but indeed was more 
likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior.” Id. at 1950. 
79 See generally Burbank, supra note 3; A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims 
in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99 (2008) (discussing examples of stronger pleading 
standards in civil rights cases). 
80 See generally Bone, Plausibility, supra note 8; Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 8; Cler-
mont & Yeazell, supra note 3; Dodson, supra note 8; Epstein, supra note 8; Hylton, supra 
note 8; Smith, supra note 8; Spencer, Plausibility, supra note 8; Spencer, Understanding, supra 
note 8; Steinman, supra note 3; Thomas, New Summary, supra note 8; Thomas, Motion, supra 
note 8; Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, supra note 8. 
81 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
82 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–52 (1986). 
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regard to judicial decision making.83 Moreover, as with pleadings, the 
standard is a judicial creation based upon a non-obvious interpretation 
of other language in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.84 The “reason-
able jury” test implements Rule 56’s language that a party may move for 
summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact” and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”85 Fi-
nally, as with pleadings, the debates focus on balancing access to courts 
(in this context, a trial by jury) with the efficiency of screening meritless 
or weak lawsuits prior to trial.86 The primary difference, however, is that 
summary judgment, unlike the typical motion to dismiss, takes place af-
ter discovery87 and is decided based on evidence in the record.88 
 Three U.S. Supreme Court decisions decided in 1986 provide the 
framework for summary judgment: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.;89 Ce-
lotex Corp. v. Catrett;90 and Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp.91 Each is briefly summarized below.92 
 In Anderson, the Court construed Rule 56’s requirement that there 
be a “genuine” issue for trial as dependent on whether “a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”93 In explaining 
how courts should engage in this “reasonable jury could” inquiry, the 
Court provided a few guiding principles. First, the determination de-
pends on the burden of proof and the applicable “evidentiary standard 
of proof” at trial.94 Thus, in theory, whether a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for a party may depend on whether the party would 
have the burden of persuasion at trial and whether the standard of 
proof would be by a “preponderance of the evidence” or by “clear and 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Miller, supra note 11, at 1133–34 (noting problems with the standard for sum-
mary judgment); Thomas, supra note 11, at 784 (same). 
84 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 
85 Id. 
86 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
87 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2). A party may seek a continuance to obtain further discov-
ery before responding to a motion for summary judgment. See id. 
88 Id. 56(c)(2). Summary judgment may be decided based on “the pleadings, the dis-
covery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits.” Id. 
89 477 U.S. 242. 
90 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
91 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
92 See infra notes 93–121 and accompanying text; see also Steinman, supra note 3, at 
1357 (listing these cases as the three most cited cases of all time by federal courts). 
93 477 U.S. at 248. 
94 Id. at 252. 
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convincing evidence.”95 Second, courts must draw “legitimate” and “jus-
tifiable” inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.96 Finally, courts 
must not weigh the credibility of witnesses.97 
 The Celotex decision further developed the Court’s analysis in 
Anderson by rejecting the requirement that moving parties who would 
not have the burden of proof at trial (typically defendants) must offer 
evidence tending to disprove the nonmoving party’s allegations.98 The 
case involved a wrongful death claim based on exposure to asbestos 
manufactured or distributed by fifteen defendants.99 Celotex, one of 
the defendants, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
plaintiff did not have sufficient evidence showing that plaintiff’s de-
ceased husband was exposed to Celotex asbestos.100 The district court 
granted summary judgment but the appellate court reversed, reasoning 
that Celotex had failed to offer evidence negating plaintiff’s claim that 
her deceased husband had been exposed to Celotex asbestos.101 The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.102 
 Consistent with Anderson, the Court explained that the crucial de-
termination is whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff by a 
preponderance of the evidence.103 Because Celotex would not have the 
burden of proof at trial, it had no affirmative obligation when moving 
for summary judgment to offer evidence tending to disprove or negate 
                                                                                                                      
95 See id. In other words, an inference from the evidence that may be reasonable under 
the preponderance standard may not be reasonable under the clear and convincing stan-
dard. See id. 
96 Id. at 255. 
[T]he weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of 
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 
drawn in his favor. 
Id. 
97 Id. (“Credibility determinations . . . are jury functions . . . .”). Anderson involved a li-
bel suit brought by a not-for-profit “citizens’ lobby” against a magazine, its publisher, and 
other executives for a series of articles allegedly portraying the plaintiffs as “neo-Nazi, anti-
Semitic, racist, and Fascist.” Id. at 245. On remand, the district court concluded that a 
reasonable jury could find some of the plaintiffs’ allegations to be true by clear and con-
vincing evidence, but some it could not. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, Civ. A. No. 81-
2240, 1991 WL 186998, at *9 (D.D.C. May 1, 1991). 
98 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–25. 
99 Id. at 319. 
100 Id. at 319–20. 
101 Id. at 319. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 322–23. 
1464 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1451 
the plaintiff’s allegations.104 Rather, Celotex could meet its initial obliga-
tion by “‘showing’ —that is, pointing out to the district court—that 
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 
case.”105 Once the defendant makes this showing, the nonmoving party 
must respond with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find in its favor.106 On remand, the appellate court concluded that 
the plaintiff did in fact have sufficient evidence to withstand the mo-
tion.107 
 Finally, in Matsushita, the Court discussed the summary judgment 
standard for nonmoving parties in the context of antitrust law.108 
Whereas Bell Atlantic discussed when allegations are plausible enough 
to suggest conspiracy at the motion to dismiss stage, Matsushita dis-
cussed when a plaintiff has sufficient evidence at the summary judg-
ment stage.109 
 Matsushita involved an alleged conspiracy by Japanese television 
manufacturers to fix prices.110 The defendants had allegedly conspired 
to raise prices in Japan and lower prices in the United States.111 Defen-
dants moved for summary judgment, and the Court concluded that 
evidence of price differences in Japan and the United States was, with-
out more, insufficient to survive summary judgment.112 First, the Court 
                                                                                                                      
104 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Confusion regarding the defendant’s burden can be traced 
to the Court’s 1970 decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., in which the Court appeared to 
place such a requirement on the defendant. See 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 
105 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Exactly what is required to “show” or “point out” an absence 
of evidence is still a subject of debate. Miller, supra note 11, at 1063–64 (“One source of 
confusion is the precise standard by which the moving party discharges its burden of show-
ing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”); Redish, supra note 12, at 1344 (la-
menting that the Court “failed to explain exactly what ‘pointing out’ actually means”); 
Steinman, supra note 12, at 122–26 (discussing this problem). See generally David P. Currie, 
Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 72 (1977); Martin B. 
Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745 (1974). 
106 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. The Court noted that the nonmoving party’s evidence need 
not necessarily be in a form admissible at trial. Id. at 324. 
107 See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The 
plaintiff’s evidence consisted of three documents: a transcript of her husband’s deposition, 
a letter from her husband’s former employer, and a letter from an insurance company. 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320. 
108 See 475 U.S. at 585–87. 
109 See id. The Court also phrased the general standard as “[w]here the record taken as 
a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party . . . .” Id. at 
587. The use of “rational” in this context appears to be synonymous with “reasonable.” See 
infra note 113 and accompanying text. In other contexts, however, the two terms may 
mean different things. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism 48–54 (1993). 
110 475 U.S. at 577–78. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 578, 598. 
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noted that the conspiracy as described by the plaintiff was “implausible” 
because it “[made] no economic sense.”113 Second, and similar to Bell 
Atlantic, the Court noted that defendants’ conduct, as alleged by the 
plaintiff, was equally consistent with—and indeed maybe more likely 
the result of—independent conduct by the defendants (which would 
not give rise to liability).114 Therefore, without any other evidence of 
conspiracy, the Court concluded that no reasonable jury could find for 
the plaintiff.115 The Court remanded to determine whether “other evi-
dence [was] sufficiently unambiguous to permit a rational trier of fact 
to find that [defendants] conspired to price predatorily.”116 
 In a subsequent decision, the Court clarified the relationship be-
tween Matsushita’s holding and the summary judgment standard in an-
titrust cases: “Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party’s in-
ferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that 
was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision. If the plain-
tiff’s theory is economically senseless, no reasonable jury could find in 
its favor . . . .”117 More generally, Matsushita clarified that a nonmoving 
party cannot survive summary judgment merely by producing some 
favorable evidence when a reasonable jury could not find in its favor 
based on that evidence.118 
 Although the three cases provide a framework for assessing mo-
tions for summary judgment, they fail to provide criteria to guide and 
constrain judicial decision making on the crucial issue: whether a par-
ticular inference from the evidence in the record could be made by a 
“reasonable” jury.119 Without such criteria, the familiar guidelines—to 
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. at 587. The conclusions were based on the lack of an apparent economic motive 
among defendants. See id. at 588–93. 
114 See id. at 587–88. 
115 See id. at 597. 
116 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. 
117 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468–69 (1992) (af-
firming denial of summary judgment in antitrust case on issue of whether a defendant’s 
lack of market power in the primary equipment market precludes the possibility of market 
power in derivative aftermarkets). 
118 See Redish, supra note 12, at 1349–50 (noting that the opinion rejected the “slight 
evidence” position, in which any evidence is sufficient to get to trial). 
119 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Scott v. Harris illustrates this problem. See 
550 U.S. 372, 381–86 (2007). The majority concluded that no reasonable jury could find 
for the plaintiff in his civil rights claim against a police officer for running him off the 
road during a high-speed pursuit. Id. at 386. In concluding that no reasonable jury could 
find the officer’s action unreasonable, the majority cited to a video recording from a cam-
era on the officer’s car and invited readers to see for themselves that the officer’s conduct 
was reasonable. Id. at 378 n.5. Justice Stevens watched and disagreed, instead concluding 
that a reasonable jury could find the officer’s conduct unreasonable. See id. at 389–97. No 
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consider the burden and standard of proof; to draw reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the nonmoving party; and to not consider witness 
credibility—fail to provide a principled way of drawing this crucial dis-
tinction and instead leave it to, in Professor Arthur Miller’s apt phrase, 
“the general anarchy of trial court discretion.”120 And, as with plead-
ings, applications of this unprincipled discretion face serious criticisms 
that courts are denying access to deserving parties for the sake of effi-
ciency by dispensing with lawsuits perceived by some judges to be merit-
less, weak, or otherwise unpopular.121 
C. Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 During trial or after a jury’s verdict, a party may move for judg-
ment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on the ground that there is insuffi-
cient evidence supporting the opposing party on one or more issues.122 
As with the summary judgment standard, the standard for JMOL gen-
erally depends on what a reasonable jury could find.123 Absent criteria 
separating reasonable from unreasonable inferences, the JMOL stan-
dard likewise fails to guide and constrain judges in a meaningful and 
principled manner. Moreover, from a normative perspective, the fact 
that the motion arises at or after trial reduces some of the efficiency 
considerations that are invoked to justify the pleading and summary 
judgment standards. 
 The Supreme Court has explained that the JMOL and summary 
judgment standards “mirror” each other;124 Federal Rule of Procedure 
50(a) states that JMOL may be entered against a party when “a reason-
able jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for 
                                                                                                                      
criteria were provided from either side for how the disagreement could be settled. See id. at 
372–97. Moreover, there does not appear to be widespread shared intuitions about the 
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going 
To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 843–
48 (2009). 
120 Miller, supra note 11, at 1134. 
121 See Bronsteen, supra note 12, at 542 (noting that judges’ own self-interest in elimi-
nating cases “place[s] a thumb on the scale in favor of the defendant”); Redish, supra note 
12, at 1354 (discussing the “delegitimizing impact” of aggressive use of summary judgment 
and arguing that the “democratic system’s respect for the individual,” the right to a jury, 
and the “political legitimacy of the adjudicatory process” require judicial restraint); 
Schneider, supra note 12, at 715 (“[G]ender cases illustrate[] the way in which current 
summary judgment practice permits subtle bias to go unchecked.”). 
122 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50; see supra note 10. 
123 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 
124 Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250–51. 
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the party.”125 In deciding a motion for JMOL, courts determine 
whether, based on the evidence admitted at trial, a reasonable jury 
could find for the nonmoving party (or must find for the moving 
party).126 The decision of what a reasonable jury could do depends on 
the substantive law, the burden of proof, and the decision rule.127 Thus, 
as with summary judgment, what may be reasonable under the pre-
ponderance standard may be unreasonable under the clear and con-
vincing standard. Moreover, as with summary judgment, courts must 
draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and they 
must not judge the credibility of witnesses.128 
 As with summary judgment, determining when evidence is suffi-
cient for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party has proven 
to be a notoriously difficult task for courts.129 Supreme Court and ap-
pellate case law provide little general guidance,130 and the JMOL stan-
dard is “difficult to elaborate upon or further define.”131 
II. The Theory of Procedural Accuracy 
 The “plausibility” pleading standard and the “reasonable jury” 
standard—in their summary judgment and JMOL manifestations—face 
similar doctrinal, interpretive, and normative problems.132 This should 
not be surprising upon reflection. All three procedural devices func-
                                                                                                                      
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Such judgments should be granted only after the non-moving 
party “has been fully heard” on the issue. See id. 
126 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. Granting a renewed motion for JMOL thus implies that 
the jury’s verdict was unreasonable. See id. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. Courts may also grant motions for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 50(c) when verdicts are “against the weight of the evidence,” and there is disagree-
ment about whether credibility may be considered in this determination. See Cassandra 
Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 157, 180–82 (2008). 
129 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250–51. A JMOL interferes with 
parties’ constitutional right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment when there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a contrary verdict. See generally Galloway v. United States, 319 
U.S. 372 (1943); Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Gasoline 
Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931). Thus, having appropriate crite-
ria for delineating when evidence is sufficient is a matter of constitutional importance. 
130 For example, the Court’s 1943 opinion in Galloway v. United States—which recog-
nized the power of courts to direct verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence—fails to 
provide any general criteria for separating reasonable from unreasonable inferences. Com-
pare Galloway, 319 U.S. at 387 (concluding that plaintiff’s evidence was too speculative to 
support a verdict), with Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S 645, 653 (1946) (stating that evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict “[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative 
facts to support the conclusion”). 
131 Miller, supra note 11, at 1058. 
132 See supra notes 40–131 and accompanying text. 
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tion, at least in part, to screen out cases that would otherwise be de-
cided at trial. And, for all three devices, the Supreme Court has articu-
lated vague standards that necessarily depend on the underlying proof 
process, but has not sufficiently tied these standards to underlying 
proof considerations.133 As a result, chaos has ensued with each device. 
Moreover, attempts by scholars to remedy this chaos by offering doc-
trinal interpretations or normative theories based on a preferred bal-
ance between access to courts and the need to eliminate weak, costly, or 
otherwise undesirable lawsuits are incomplete because they likewise fail 
to connect the procedural devices to the deeper proof issues on which 
the devices depend.134 
 This Part provides a general theory that explains and justifies the 
standards for each device in light of the civil litigation system as a 
whole.135 The central idea is that the procedural devices function to 
align outcomes with the requirements of legal proof.136 This Part expli-
cates this alignment through the concept of “procedural accuracy.”137 
Before turning to the theory, this Part first discusses the procedural 
values underlying the theory and defines important terms.138 
A. Preliminary Considerations: Procedural Values and Two Types of Accuracy 
 The three procedural devices—pleadings, summary judgment, 
and JMOL—occur as parts of a unified system of civil litigation.139 This 
system serves a number of important societal functions, primarily: pro-
viding a forum for parties to resolve disputes and vindicate rights; in-
centives to settle disputes; and guidance and deterrence to citizens 
more generally. An array of procedural values underlies and animates 
the system, and these values provide criteria by which to evaluate or 
justify the system and its parts. A brief discussion of these values will 
help to both clarify and evaluate the theory presented below.140 
 The procedural values that underlie civil litigation include: factual 
accuracy, efficiency (including costs to parties, courts, and society gen-
                                                                                                                      
133 See supra notes 40–131 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra note 8. For a notable exception exploring procedural issues in light of the 
underlying proof process, see Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control 
Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 Va. L. Rev. 218, 218–31 (1961). 
135 See infra notes 158–228 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 158–228 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 158–228 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 139–157 and accompanying text. 
139 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 50, 56. 
140 See infra notes 141–157 and accompanying text. 
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erally), participation, respect for substantive rights, notice, predictabil-
ity, fairness (including notions of equality), and political legitimacy.141 
These values both inform the system and provide standards by which to 
evaluate it. 
 In the analysis, this Article gives central importance to accuracy for 
two reasons, one general and one specific.142 First, in general, accuracy 
appears to be fundamental because the system could not achieve the 
other values without a sufficient degree of accuracy.143 A system that sys-
tematically issued false judgments would: impose enormous costs on 
society as well as undeserved costs on losing parties; seriously diminish 
any value of notice and participation; create unpredictability that would 
frustrate the system’s guidance and deterrence functions; and rather 
quickly come to be viewed as unfair and devoid of political legitimacy.144 
 The second, more specific reason for the focus on accuracy is that 
it appears to be central to the current debates regarding pleadings, 
summary judgment, and JMOL.145 Those who argue for more relaxed 
standards and greater access to courts and juries focus on accuracy 
(along with participation).146 They argue that stronger standards will 
risk dismissing the claims of, or rendering judgments against, otherwise 
deserving parties.147 In other words, a downside to stronger standards is 
that they will result in more pretrial decisions against parties whose al-
legations are true.148 Moreover, although the value of participation con-
sists of more than just its contribution to accurate outcomes,149 we cer-
tainly value it, in part, for that reason. Likewise, those who argue for 
                                                                                                                      
141 See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 Duke L.J. 561, 
594 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 237–73 (2004). 
142 See infra notes 143–153 and accompanying text. 
143 Some procedural rules, such as statutes of limitations, may sacrifice case accuracy in 
order to foster overall systemic accuracy. See Solum, supra note 141, at 248 (discussing the 
distinction). 
144 To put it another way, factual accuracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for just legal judgments. See William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory 
Essays 76 (2d ed. 2006) (“Establishing the truth . . . is a necessary condition for achieving 
justice in adjudication; incorrect results are one form of injustice.”). 
145 See infra notes 146–153 and accompanying text. 
146 Bone, Plausibility, supra note 8, at 878–85; Spencer, Plausibility, supra note 8, at 431–
34; Steinman, supra note 3, at 1313; Thomas, New Summary, supra note 8, at 38–41. 
147 Bone, Plausibility, supra note 8, at 878–85; Spencer, Plausibility, supra note 8, at 431–
34; Steinman, supra note 3, at 1313; Thomas, New Summary, supra note 8, at 38–41. 
148 Although aggressive use of these devices will often result in pro-defendant deci-
sions, aggressive use of summary judgment and JMOL can also result in erroneous pro-
plaintiff decisions. 
149 On the value of participation, see Solum, supra note 141, at 273–305. 
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stronger standards also focus on accuracy (along with efficiency).150 
They argue that stronger standards will foster efficiency by eliminating 
more meritless claims earlier in the litigation process.151 The “meritless” 
claims are those that are false, or would not be—or are unlikely to be— 
proven at trial.152 Moreover, as with participation, the value of efficiency 
is important, in part, because of its contribution to accuracy: a system 
that is more efficient at screening meritless claims will have more re-
sources to devote to claims with merit.153 
 A caveat must be presented. Although accuracy is given central 
importance, the significance of other procedural values—for example, 
efficiency, participation, and fairness—should not be diminished. Each 
presents a legitimate independent criterion by which to evaluate the 
analysis, and the Article discusses these other values when pertinent. 
 Another preliminary consideration must also be addressed. This 
concerns an ambiguity in what is meant by “accurate” in litigation con-
texts. The factual allegations that underlie parties’ claims may be accu-
rate because they accord with what actually happened in the circum-
stances described,154 or they may be accurate because the parties have 
proven them in court by satisfying the applicable evidentiary proof 
rules. This Article refers to the former as “material accuracy” and the 
latter as “procedural accuracy.”155 A simple example illustrates the dif-
ference. Suppose (1) a negligence case involving a car accident turns 
solely on whether the plaintiff or the defendant ran a red light, and (2) 
                                                                                                                      
150 See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 8, at 930–35 (arguing a penalty system “might be 
appropriate for intentional meritless filings”); Epstein, supra note 8, at 71; Hylton, supra 
note 8, at 45–48. 
151 See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 8, at 930–35; Epstein, supra note 8, at 71; Hyl-
ton, supra note 8, at 45–48. 
152 There is an ambiguity lurking here with “accurate.” A decision could be accurate 
because it correctly identifies (or “corresponds” with) the events in dispute, or a decision 
may be accurate because it correctly identifies (or “corresponds” with) whether the claim 
has been proven. I return to this important distinction shortly. See supra note 154 and ac-
companying text. 
153 See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 8, at 930–35. 
154 In addition to disputes about historical facts, parties may also dispute whether cur-
rent conditions exist or whether further conditions are likely to exist. Any of these deter-
minations may be materially accurate. 
155 An error in this second sense may be considered a “probatory” error because legal 
fact-finders will have erred in evaluating the probative value of the evidence. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 403; see also Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal 
Epistemology 12, 13, 210–11 (2006) (distinguishing between material errors, probatory 
errors, and errors in applying criminal procedure doctrine such as the exclusionary rule); 
Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 Ind. L.J. 651, 662 (1997) (“An erroneous 
outcome, as we have defined it, occurs when the party whom the evidence supports none-
theless loses . . . .”). 
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the defendant did in fact run the red light. A judgment for the plaintiff 
is materially accurate and a judgment for the defendant is a material 
error, regardless of the evidence supporting either side. By contrast, a 
judgment for the plaintiff is procedurally accurate if the plaintiff proved 
the elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and this 
same judgment would be a procedural error if she did not prove one of 
more of the elements by a preponderance of the evidence,156 regardless 
of what actually happened at the stoplight. Note that neither material 
nor procedural accuracy depends on the other—it is possible for a ma-
terially accurate judgment to be procedurally erroneous and for a pro-
cedurally accurate judgment to be materially erroneous. 
 The distinction between material and procedural accuracy not 
only clarifies an ambiguity but is fundamental to my theory.157 
B. The Theory of Procedural Accuracy 
 The theory of procedural accuracy consists of three premises.158 
First, the law of evidence and the trial proof process function to in-
crease the material accuracy of judgments and to allocate the risk of ma-
terial error among the parties in a fair and socially desirable manner.159 
Second, the procedural devices of pleadings and motions to dismiss, 
summary judgment, and JMOL function to increase procedural accuracy 
by aligning outcomes with what would be dictated by evidentiary proof 
rules at trial.160 The three procedural devices are serving material accu-
racy indirectly by aligning outcomes with the evidentiary proof rules 
that focus on material accuracy directly. Third, given this alignment 
function, the procedural devices depend upon the underlying proof 
rules and thus, the standards for implementing the devices ought to be 
informed by the requirements (and goals) of the proof rules.161 
1. Evidence Law and Material Accuracy 
 The law of evidence focuses on material accuracy, and allocating 
the risk of material error, with two types of rules. The first type (“micro-
                                                                                                                      
156 Likewise, a judgment for the defendant would be procedurally accurate when the 
plaintiff failed to prove one or more elements, and this judgment would be a procedural 
error if the plaintiff proved each of the elements. 
157 See infra notes 158–202 and accompanying text. 
158 See infra notes 159–202 and accompanying text. 
159 See infra notes 162–181 and accompanying text. 
160 See infra notes 182–195 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text. 
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level” rules) regulates the admission or exclusion of individual items of 
physical evidence or testimony.162 These rules regulate the flow of in-
formation to legal fact-finders and control the evidentiary basis on 
which decisions will be made.163 A primary goal of these rules is to in-
crease the material accuracy of decisions both by admitting probative 
evidence and by excluding evidence likely to decrease material accu-
racy; evidence would be likely to decrease material accuracy if it were 
irrelevant or had a tendency to mislead, confuse, be misinterpreted, or 
otherwise detract from the goal of accurate fact-finding.164 The second 
type (“macro-level” rules) regulates how fact-finders ought to make de-
cisions based on the admitted evidence as a whole. These rules include 
burdens of proof and decision rules for when the burdens of proof are 
satisfied (for example, a “preponderance of the evidence”),165 and they 
instruct fact-finders on when the elements of a claim or affirmative de-
fense have been proven. 
 The macro-level rules focus on material accuracy and the risk of 
material error by specifying how to reach decisions when faced with 
uncertainty.166 To illuminate how the rules do this, it may help to first 
reflect on what factual decision making would look like in the absence 
of these rules. If fact-finders could be certain as to what happened in 
                                                                                                                      
162 See Fed. R. Evid. 102, 403, 412(b)-(c), 501, 611(a), 807, 901(b). 
163 See id. 102, 403, 412(b)-(c), 501, 611(a), 807, 901(b). 
164 See id. 102 (stating that the rules shall be construed so that “truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined”). The rules also serve a number of other pro-
cedural values: efficiency, see id. 403, 611(a); predictability, see id. 901(b); notice, see id. 807, 
412(c); and substantive rights, see id. 412(b)(C), 501. 
165 Nothing in my analysis will turn on a distinction between “rules” and “standards.” 
For a discussion of these rules in light of this distinction, see Pardo, Second-Order, supra 
note 30, at 1105–07. The macro-level rules also include evidentiary presumptions and 
comment on the evidence. 
166 Many courts and scholars have discussed the role of legal decision rules. See, e.g., 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (explaining that decision rules reflect judg-
ments about “the weight of the private and public interests affected,” and “a societal judg-
ment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants”); Addington 
v. Texas, 411 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (explaining that a decision rule “serves to allocate the 
risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the 
ultimate decision”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that the choice of a decision rule “reflect[s] a very fundamental assessment of the 
comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations”); Laudan, supra note 155, at 
12, 13, 210–11; Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 133–34 (2005); David Hamer, 
Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements and the Errors That Are Expected to Flow from 
Them, 1 U. New Eng. L. J. 71, 74–81 (2004) (Austl.); D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of 
Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 Int’l J. Evidence & Proof 1, 1–
28 (1999); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1159, 1159–74 (1983). 
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any given case, then the macro-level proof rules would be unnecessary. 
Moreover, if a rule required fact-finders to be absolutely certain before 
finding a claim proven, this would lead to a large number of material 
errors and would unfairly allocate all of the risk of error to plaintiffs. 
 To illustrate these points, consider again the simple negligence case 
involving an automobile accident in which the plaintiff claims that the 
defendant ran a red light and caused the accident. Now, suppose the 
evidence at trial shows it to be much more likely (but not certain) that 
the defendant ran the light and caused the accident. Assuming the evi-
dence is a good indicator of the truth, a decision for the defendant is 
more likely to be inaccurate and places the risk of error on the plaintiff. 
Moreover, if we imagine 100 similar cases in which the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions are much more likely to be true (than the defendant versions of 
what occurred), then 100 decisions for defendants is systematically likely 
to produce a significant number of material errors while placing the risk 
of error solely on the plaintiffs. The “preponderance of the evidence” 
rule responds to these concerns. By requiring an outcome for plaintiffs 
when their claims are more likely true, the rule mandates the findings 
that are more likely to be true.167 Assuming the evidence is a good indi-
cator of truth, the rule ought to foster material accuracy.168 The pre-
ponderance rule also divides the risk of error roughly equally among 
the parties.169 This allocation is justified because of the perceived rela-
                                                                                                                      
167 To further illustrate this point, consider the following probabilistic example. Sup-
pose 100 cases in which the plaintiff’s claim is 0.6 likely and the preponderance rule re-
quires proof beyond 0.5 (where certain truth equals 1 and certain falsity equals 0). One 
would expect 60 of these cases to be correctly decided and 40 to be in error. But if one 
raises the decision rule to somewhere higher than 0.6, then one would expect 60 errors 
and 40 correct decisions. This refers to expected errors, not actual errors. See Hamer, supra 
note 166, at 79; Kaye, supra note 166, at 1–28. The numbers assume that the probability 
assessments reflect the actual likelihood of a proposition being true. To the extent the 
probability assessments deviate from the actual likelihood, actual errors are likely to devi-
ate from expected ones. Although the probabilistic example is useful for illustrating these 
points, this Article argues below that a probabilistic conception is not the best way to think 
of decision rules for purposes of the procedural devices. 
168 See Stein, supra note 166, at 144 (arguing that decisionmakers will “maximize the 
total number of correct decisions by treating their best chances of arriving at the factually 
correct result as decisive”); id. (“[T]he error-minimizing objective treats every error as a 
fixed disutility unit (u) . . . . Under this assumption, utility demands that a party whose case 
has a probability P prevails whenever Pu > (1-P)u, that is, whenever P > 0.5.”). 
169 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (“[T]he preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between liti-
gants . . . .”). The rule allocates the risk “roughly” equally because ties go to the defendant. 
The best justification for this tiebreaker is that plaintiffs are arguing for a resolution that 
disrupts the status quo and thus should bear the risk of error when the evidence is in 
equipoise. A similar justification supports the rule that an evenly divided appellate panel 
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tive importance, significance, or costs of the two types of errors (false 
positives and false negatives),170 as well as the desire to create a fair and 
neutral forum in which to resolve civil disputes.171 
 One important exception includes certain types of civil cases in 
which errors favoring plaintiffs are considered to be more significant, 
problematic, or costly than errors favoring defendants. In these cases, the 
“clear and convincing evidence” standard applies to one or more ele-
ments of the plaintiff’s claim.172 Prominent examples include fraud,173 
civil commitment,174 deportation,175 denaturalization,176 termination of 
parental rights,177 decisions to terminate life,178 and proof of malice in 
                                                                                                                      
results in an affirmance of the underlying judgment. For an illuminating discussion of 
tiebreaking rules in law, see Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572923. 
170 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286; Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 391 
(1983); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (“In a civil suit between two private parties for money 
damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an errone-
ous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plain-
tiff’s favor.”). 
171 See Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty in Modern Legal Dis-
course, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 627, 633–34 (1994) (“[T]he typical civil case involves a 
contest between two indistinguishable parties vying over some good, and there is no rea-
son in advance to favor one party over the other. We thus strive to treat them equally by 
making errors against them in a roughly symmetrical fashion . . . .”); Ronald J. Allen, The 
Error of Expected Loss Minimization, 2 Law, Probability & Risk 1, 4 (2003) (“[T]he pre-
ponderance rule manifests the general social policy to be fair and even handed to all the 
parties . . . and equal treatment is incontrovertibly one critical component of fairness 
. . . .”); see also Solum, supra note 141, at 286–89 (discussing the role of equality in proce-
dural justice). 
172 Addington, 411 U.S. at 424 (“[T]his Court has used the ‘clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing’ standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various 
civil cases.”). Rather than applying decision rules to types of cases, an alternative scheme 
might allow individual juries or judges to decide which rule to apply. The Supreme Court 
has rejected this alternative: 
Standards of proof, like other ‘procedural due process rules[,] are shaped by 
the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the gener-
ality of cases, not the rare exceptions.’ Since the litigants and the factfinder 
must know at the outset of a given proceeding how the risk of error will be al-
located, the standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in advance. 
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)); see also 
Stein, supra note 166, at xi (“There is no moral, political, or economic justification for 
allowing private adjudicators . . . to allocate the risk of error as they deem fit.”). 
173 See James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.21 (Daniel R. Co-
quillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997). 
174 See Addington, 411 U.S. at 423–24. 
175 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966). 
176 See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 119 (1943). 
177 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747. 
178 See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990). 
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defamation cases involving public figures.179 In these cases, the concern 
for material accuracy (and the consequent risk of error) is skewed 
asymmetrically against plaintiffs and in favor of defendants more so 
than under the preponderance rule.180 In particular, in cases in which 
plaintiffs’ claims are proven by a preponderance of the evidence but 
not by clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs will lose and bear the 
risk of error even though their claims are more likely than not to be 
materially accurate.181 
2. Alignment and Procedural Accuracy 
 Although trial provides the central forum for proof in civil litiga-
tion, many cases do not make it that far and some that do are decided 
without reliance on the fact-finder’s verdict.182 For cases that do not 
settle, the primary mechanisms for ending cases prior to, at, or after 
trial are the motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and JMOL.183 Even 
if civil trials are relatively rare,184 one should not underestimate the in-
fluence of the trial’s proof rules on the litigation process as a whole be-
cause the three procedural devices depend on, and function to align 
outcomes with, the proof rules.185 The devices, in other words, foster 
procedural accuracy, and this type of accuracy is determined by the un-
derlying proof rules. Moreover, the idea of procedural accuracy illumi-
nates the two primary justifications for the devices: to avoid the trial 
process when one outcome is mandated by the proof rules and to pre-
vent outcomes that are contrary to those rules (procedural errors).186 
                                                                                                                      
179 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 285–86 (1964). 
180 See supra notes 173–179 and accompanying text. 
181 Similar policies underlie the “beyond a reasonable doubt” rule in criminal cases. See 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 358–68. 
182 See infra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
183 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 50, 56. 
184 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 34, at 438–41. 
185 The trial’s proof rules also play a significant role in settlements, which are informed 
by predictions about likely trial outcomes. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selec-
tion of Disputes for Resolution, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 12–30 (1984). More generally, under 
conventional economic models of civil litigation, lawsuits will be brought when expected 
judgments exceed litigation costs, and cases will settle when the difference between the 
parties’ expected outcomes is less than the sum of litigation costs. See, e.g., Richard A. Pos-
ner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 
399, 408–10, 417–27 (1973). In such models, both expected outcomes and litigation costs 
will depend on the underlying rules that structure the proof process. See id. 
186 The devices thus foster both efficiency and procedural accuracy. The trade-off is 
that losing parties are denied the value of participation at trial, which may have independ-
ent value apart from accuracy. See Solum, supra note 141, at 273–305. 
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 Factual disputes will make it to trial when a plaintiff’s claim meets 
a threshold level of plausibility at the pleading stage and the factual 
dispute is “genuine” at the summary judgment stage.187 With pleadings, 
a claim is plausible when the plaintiff has provided an account of the 
relevant events that a reasonable jury could accept under the applica-
ble proof rules. A claim is not plausible when a reasonable jury could 
not accept it under the applicable proof rules. Whether a claim is plau-
sible is not a conclusion about whether it is materially true or false. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly in 2007 and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal in 2009 was quite plain that a claim might be true (materially) 
but still not be plausible.188 
 With summary judgment, a dispute is “genuine” only if a reason-
able jury could find for either side.189 An argument that the dispute is 
not genuine is an argument that one outcome is mandated by the evi-
dence and the macro-level proof rules.190 Then, once cases proceed to 
trial, JMOL likewise turns on whether a reasonable jury could reach a 
particular decision.191 With both devices, what is “reasonable” in a given 
case will be a function of the evidence, the burden of proof, and the 
decision standard.192 More specifically, the relevant inquiry is whether a 
reasonable jury could or must find for the party with the burden of 
proof to the level of proof required by the decision rule. As with plead-
ings, this inquiry is not whether there is only one reasonable conclusion 
about whether the allegations are true (i.e., materially accurate). The 
inquiry is whether there is only one reasonable conclusion, based on 
the evidence, about what the decision ought to be according to the 
proof rules of the trial. In other words, the inquiry is whether there is 
                                                                                                                      
187 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Some of the subject matter of factual proof in law involves not 
only historical facts but also the application of legal norms to historical facts (for example, 
in determining negligence). 
188 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). This follows directly from the Court’s rejection of its 
“no set of facts language” in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson, and its explanation that a 
claim must be more that merely “possible” to survive a motion to dismiss. A possible claim 
is one that might be materially true. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 546. 
189 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–56 (1986). The nonmoving 
party’s evidence need not be admissible at trial, so long as it could be reduced to an admis-
sible form. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). For example, a hearsay 
statement in the record might be acceptable for summary judgment, but the declarant 
may need to testify at trial if the statement does not fall under a hearsay exemption or 
exception. 
190 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250–56; supra notes 165–166. 
191 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). 
192 What may be a reasonable decision under the preponderance rule may not be rea-
sonable under the clear and convincing evidence rule. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250–56. 
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only one reasonable conclusion about what is the procedurally accurate 
outcome. 
 In performing this alignment function, the procedural devices 
serve two important goals. First, they prevent procedural errors that 
would frustrate the goals of the proof rules. Put another way, proce-
dural accuracy serves the goals of material accuracy and fair risk-of-
error allocation indirectly by ensuring that outcomes accord with the 
macro-level evidentiary rules that are designed to serve these goals di-
rectly. Second, the devices promote efficiency to the extent they pro-
duce procedurally accurate outcomes while avoiding the trial process 
(or aspects of it).193 
 Finally, if the devices functioned in ways that hindered rather than 
fostered procedural accuracy, they would risk frustrating the important 
social policy goals regarding material accuracy and the risk of error im-
plemented by the trial proof structure as part of the litigation process 
as a whole. For instance, suppose a procedural device required plain-
tiffs to show more than that a reasonable decisionmaker could find in 
their favor under the proof rules. Under this standard, plaintiffs bear a 
greater risk of error than under the trial proof structure.194 If the risk of 
material error at trial was allocated equally among the parties as a mat-
ter of policy, it would now be shifted to a greater degree onto plaintiffs. 
A semblance of equality at the proof stage would be destroyed by the 
procedural device. On the flip side, suppose a procedural device re-
quired less of plaintiffs than that a reasonable decisionmaker could 
find in its favor under the proof structure. The procedural device 
would risk the possibility of procedural error—a finding that is incon-
sistent with what is required under the proof structure—by letting the 
case proceed. This risk would be borne by defendants entitled to out-
comes in their favor under the proof rules. This risk of procedural error 
would create an additional risk of material error that defendants must 
bear in addition to the risk they already bear under the proof structure. 
Even if later proceedings rectify the possibility of procedural error, the 
device would forfeit any efficiency benefits that would flow from ending 
cases earlier when one outcome is mandated by the proof rules.195 
                                                                                                                      
193 This assumes that the costs of implementing the procedural devices are lower than 
the costs of trial. For an argument that they may not be lower in summary judgment situa-
tions, particularly if the absence of summary judgment would induce parties to settle ear-
lier, see Bronsteen, supra note 12, at 536–38. 
194 Plaintiffs’ risk now includes both that a reasonable jury could find against it and the 
risk of failing to meet the more onerous procedural standard. 
195 See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 8, at 930–35; Epstein, supra note 8, at 71. 
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3. Civil Procedure’s Dependence on Evidence Law 
 The third premise in the argument follows straightforwardly from 
the first two premises.196 If the evidentiary proof rules impose require-
ments designed to achieve goals regarding material accuracy (premise 
one), and the procedural devices function to align outcomes with the 
requirements of the proof rules (premise two), then to function prop-
erly the standards for implementing the procedural devices must derive 
their content, in part, from the requirements of the proof rules (prem-
ise three). 
 This is not to suggest that the same standard applies or ought to 
apply for each procedural device. Although the alignment function de-
pends on what is required by the proof rules, the standards must also 
account for important differences regarding where in the litigation 
process the procedural devices arise. For example, although evidence 
needs to be admissible at the JMOL stage, it does not necessarily need to 
be admissible at summary judgment.197 And with pleadings, the decision 
must be made on the basis of allegations, rather than submitted evi-
dence, made prior to an opportunity for discovery. Still, the general de-
pendence manifests itself in a number of doctrinal features recognized 
by the Supreme Court when articulating the relevant standards.198 
These include: incorporating the applicable decision standard at trial 
into the “summary judgment” and JMOL standards;199 the requirement 
at summary judgment that evidence be reducible to admissible evi-
dence;200 and the determination that the plausibility of claims at the 
pleading stage depends on the plausibility of alternative explanations of 
the relevant events.201 
 Although these features gesture toward this procedural depend-
ence, the Court has failed to take the final, and crucial, logical step of 
articulating what is required to make a pleading “plausible” or a factual 
conclusion “reasonable” in light of the evidentiary proof rules. This 
failure is a problem for reasons that may now be obvious. One cannot 
tell, for example, whether a jury conclusion is “reasonable” or “unrea-
                                                                                                                      
196 See infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra note 106. 
198 See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
199 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254–55 (“It makes no sense to say that a jury could rea-
sonably find for either party without some benchmark as to what standards govern its de-
liberations and within what boundaries its ultimate decision must fall, and these standards 
and boundaries are in fact provided by the applicable evidentiary standards.”). 
200 See supra note 106. 
201 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 567–68. 
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sonable” according to the evidence and the proof rules unless one 
knows what is required by the proof rules—that is, when particular evi-
dence will satisfy them and when it will not. Connecting the procedural 
devices to these deeper proof issues will give content to the theory of 
procedural accuracy. 202 It will also, in turn, help to clarify and justify 
particular standards in light of this alignment function within the litiga-
tion system as a whole. 
C. Giving Content to the Theory of Procedural Accuracy 
 The theory of procedural accuracy explains the primary function 
of the procedural devices and justifies this function in light of the pro-
cedural goals of the system of civil litigation. This function is the align-
ment of outcomes with the proof rules, and it is justified by the values 
of accuracy and a fair distribution of the risk of error.203 Identifying and 
justifying this function, however, does not yet tell us how to implement 
it. Implementing the theory requires linking the content of the proce-
dural devices with the content of proof rules. 
 Any procedural standard that depends on what “reasonable” jurors 
could conclude or which claims are “plausible” must employ some con-
ception of what is required by the proof rules. This is a major gap in 
discussions regarding these devices. What is “reasonable” or “plausible” 
is a function of who will have to prove what (burdens of proof) and to 
what standard. In the vast majority of civil cases, the applicable proof 
rules require plaintiffs to prove the elements of their claims (and de-
fendants to prove the elements of affirmative defenses) by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.204 But discussions of the procedural devices, in 
both case law and academic commentary, fail to provide some explana-
tion or criteria by which to assess when an element has been proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence. How, for example, can one deter-
mine whether a particular jury conclusion—that an element has been 
proven under the preponderance rule—is “reasonable” without some 
prior understanding of when evidence satisfies the preponderance 
rule? 
                                                                                                                      
202 See infra notes 203–228 and accompanying text. 
203 This function also serves a number of other procedural values such as efficiency (by 
ending cases when one outcome is mandated by the proof rules), participation and the 
right to a jury (when consistent with the underlying structure of proof), deterrence, and 
guidance regarding the substantive law. 
204 See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 3.3 (3d ed. 
2003) (noting that “the prevailing view” of the preponderance rule requires the jury to be 
“persuaded that the points to be proved are more probably so than not”). 
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 The question should give us pause. The determination necessarily 
presupposes some conception of what the preponderance rule re-
quires, if only implicitly. This presupposition most likely depends on 
the common, but problematic, conception of the proof rules as prob-
abilistic. For example, the preponderance rule requires proof beyond a 
0.5 likelihood, with 1 representing certain truth and 0 representing 
certain falsity.205 Because the decision rules specify outcomes when 
there is factual uncertainty, the probabilistic interpretation may be seen 
as a useful way to conceive of that uncertainty and relate it to the un-
derlying goals of accuracy and distributing the risk of error. As a gen-
eral matter, however, this interpretation suffers from deep conceptual 
problems and empirical limitations that make it ill-suited as either an 
explanatory or a normative theory of the proof rules. I have discussed 
these problems in depth elsewhere and many of them can be put to the 
side for purposes of this discussion.206 Simply as a pragmatic matter, the 
probabilistic conception is an ill-suited tool for providing content to the 
procedural devices and for guiding and constraining their applications. 
 To illustrate, suppose that with summary judgment or JMOL the 
applicable standard was articulated as whether, based on the evidence, 
a reasonable jury could find that the element was proven beyond 0.5 
likely. How are judges to decide which findings are “reasonable” and 
which are “unreasonable”? One option might be to rely on objective 
data, if it exists, regarding how likely the alleged fact is given the avail-
able evidence.207 Courts, however, virtually never have sufficient data 
for this option to work. Additionally, if courts did have a truly objective 
answer,208 then it would be the only reasonable conclusion, rendering 
the jury superfluous. The court simply should enter judgment based on 
this answer. A second option might be to rely on subjective judgments 
of fact-finders about the likelihood. But these assessments could be any-
thing at all between 0 and 1, and there are no criteria for separating 
“reasonable” from “unreasonable” assessments (other than the equally 
                                                                                                                      
205 See Hamer, supra note 166, at 77. 
206 For discussions of these problems, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Prob-
lematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. Legal Stud. 107, 107–10 (2007); 
Pardo, Second-Order, supra note 30, at 1100–02; Pardo & Allen, supra note 30, at 247–51. 
207 For example, one could look for base-rate data regarding how often the disputed 
fact is true when the evidentiary fact is true as compared to how often the disputed fact is 
false when the evidentiary fact is true. 
208 Actually, the “truly objective” answer to this question will be 1 or 0, as the event ei-
ther did or did not happen. 
2010] A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation 1481 
subjective assessments of the judge).209 Likewise, if the “plausibility” 
pleading standard required some probabilistic threshold, then these 
same problems would arise, and it would contradict the Court’s explicit 
statement that it was not imposing a “probability” requirement.210 
 Fortunately, there is a more theoretically useful way to characterize 
the proof rules for purposes of the procedural devices.211 Rather than 
focus on probabilistic relationships between the evidence and the facts 
to be proven, this alternative looks at explanatory relationships be-
tween the two.212 Under this conception, fact-finders examine whether 
particular explanations, if true, would better explain the evidence and 
disputed events than alternative explanations.213 For example, in the 
simple negligence example concerning the car accident posed above, 
the relevant inquiry would depend on how well the fact that the defen-
dant ran the red light explains the evidence and the events (as com-
pared to alternative explanations). Of course, what makes one explana-
tion better than another will depend on the judgment of fact-finders, 
but this approach improves on the probabilistic conception by focusing 
the inquiry on features of the evidence.214 The quality of competing 
                                                                                                                      
209 See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms, and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 
Int’l J. Evidence & Proof 254, 255 (1997) (“[V]irtually any relationship at all can exist 
between subjective assessments of liability and the truth of factual assertions at trial.”). 
210 Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556; see also id. (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed 
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable . . . .”). 
211 See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
212 See Pardo, Second-Order, supra note 30, at 1100–02; Pardo & Allen, supra note 30, at 
247–51. This conception views the inferences at trial as primarily “abductive” or as “infer-
ences to the best explanation,” rather than as probabilistic (“enumerative”) inferences. The 
idea of “inference to the best explanation” has been explored more fully in the philosophy of 
science. See Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation 55–69 (2004); Gilbert 
Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 Phil. Rev. 88, 88 (1965); see also Amalia 
Amaya, Inference to the Best Legal Explanation, in Legal Evidence & Proof 135–56 (Hendrik 
Kaptein et al. eds., 2009); Douglas N. Walton, Abductive Reasoning 35 (2004); Paul R. 
Thagard, Evaluating Explanations in Law, Science, and Everyday Life, 15 Current Directions 
Psychol. Sci. 141, 141–45 (2006). 
213 This process generally involves two steps: generating possible explanations (those 
of the parties and others formulated by fact-finders) and then examining which one best 
explains the evidence. 
214 Explanations involve both “acts of explaining” and the explanations themselves, 
both of which concern epistemic relationships between propositions. Explanations typi-
cally provide answers or understanding about, for example, why something happened, why 
it is the way it is, why it is true, or how it functions. See Peter Achinstein, The Nature of 
Explanation 74–102 (1983); see also Philip Johnson-Laird, How We Reason 177 (2006) 
(“An explanation accounts for what we do not understand in terms of what we do under-
stand.”). Most importantly, explanations are “contrastive” in the sense that we assess the 
strength of an explanation by contrasting it with other competing explanations. See Lip-
ton, supra note 212, at 33 (“A contrastive phenomenon consists of a fact and a foil, and 
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explanations will depend on the details of individual cases, but a num-
ber of general criteria will often make one explanation better than an-
other. For example, a consistent explanation will be better than a con-
tradictory one; one that explains more of the evidence and the most 
important and disputed items of evidence will be better than one that 
fails to explain key items of evidence; and an explanation that better fits 
with the backgrounds, experiences, and knowledge of fact-finders will 
be better than one that requires them to make implausible or unrealis-
tic assumptions.215 The criteria cannot be combined into an algo-
rithmic procedure for determining outcomes, but the focus on features 
of the evidence provides a more objective focal point for judicial discus-
sions of why particular conclusions are reasonable or not. 
 Under the explanatory approach, the proof rules may be under-
stood based on how they fit with this process of comparing alternative 
explanations. The preponderance rule is satisfied when the best of the 
available explanations favors the party with the burden of proof, in the 
sense that this explanation includes the elements the party must 
prove.216 By contrast, the proof requirements have not been met when 
the best available explanation favors the other party, in the sense that it 
fails to include one or more of the elements. Assuming that the quality 
of an explanation is a good indication of its likely truth,217 this concep-
tion accords with the goals and values underlying the preponderance 
rule (and the litigation system) regarding accuracy and the risk of er-
                                                                                                                      
the same fact may have several different foils. We may not explain why the leaves turn yel-
low in November simpliciter, but only for example why they turn yellow in November rather 
than in January, or why they turn yellow in November rather than blue.”). 
215 These general criteria for evaluating explanations apply broadly in a variety of dif-
ferent domains, see Thagard, supra note 212, at 141–45, and they are the criteria that ju-
rors employ in deciding cases. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of 
Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 521–44 (1991) (identifying 
criteria jurors use to construct narrative accounts of the evidence at trial); see also Neil 
Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 135 (2007) (“Many subse-
quent studies . . . have lent support to the basic assumptions of the story model.”); Shari 
Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-
Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 201, 212 (2006) (“[T]he jurors attempted to con-
struct plausible accounts of the events that led to the plaintiff’s suit. They evaluated com-
peting accounts and considered alternative explanations for outcomes.”). 
216 For further elaboration of the trial proof rules in explanatory terms, see generally 
Pardo, Second-Order, supra note 30. 
217 Of course, sometimes the best available explanation of the evidence will turn out to 
be false. This is the general “problem of induction” that affects both probabilistic and ex-
planatory conceptions of proof. 
2010] A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation 1483 
ror.218 Because a better explanation is more likely to be true than a 
worse one, the rule specifies the outcomes that are more likely to be 
accurate than their alternatives. Moreover, the rule divides the risk of 
error roughly equally among the parties because each bears a recipro-
cal risk of error whenever the best available explanation is not in its fa-
vor. Similarly, when the decision rule rises from the preponderance 
standard to the “clear and convincing” evidence standard, the best 
available explanation must favor the plaintiff and be clearly and con-
vincingly better than the alternatives. This requirement shifts a corre-
sponding risk of error onto plaintiffs and away from defendants in ac-
cord with the policy of the rule.219 
 This explanatory approach to the proof rules thus provides criteria 
for articulating the standards for the procedural devices in light of their 
alignment function, taking into account differences among the devices 
and when they arise in the litigation process. 
 At the pleading stage, plaintiffs will satisfy the plausibility threshold 
by pleading a claim that provides a plausible explanation of the relevant 
events that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.220 If, however, there is an 
alternative explanation of the events that a reasonable jury must find at 
least as plausible and that would not entitle the plaintiff to relief, then 
the claim ought to be dismissed—unless the plaintiff’s allegations “raise 
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” making the 
claim plausible.221 If there is an equally (or more) plausible explanation 
                                                                                                                      
218 Which explanations to consider will depend on how the parties contrast their cases 
(and their theories of what happened). Explanations can sometimes be disjunctive (a party 
may claim that “either X or Y happened” and that each possibility supports its case), and 
fact-finders ought to consider the conjunction of available explanations that support each 
side. Moreover, the better explanation may sometimes be quite general (“some negligent 
act by the defendant caused my accident” in a res ipsa loquitur case) rather than a specific, 
detailed account. The requisite level of specificity will depend on the substantive law and 
how the parties contrast their cases. 
219 See Addington, 411 U.S. at 423. Explanatory considerations may be used to articulate 
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and its underlying policy goal of allocating the 
risk of error away from criminal defendants. See Pardo, Second-Order, supra note 30; Michael 
S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Law’s Epistemology, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 347, 347–83 
(2007). 
220 This Article elaborates on what would make an explanation “plausible” in the next 
Part. See infra notes 229–245 and accompanying text. 
221 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that attorneys signing pleadings represent 
that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support” or will likely have such support 
“after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery”). Potential costs and 
other burdens of discovery appeared to be motivating factors in both Bell Atlantic and Iqbal, 
and what is necessary to create a “reasonable expectation” may therefore rise as these costs 
and burdens rise. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. 
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 15–17 (2010) (suggesting a similar relation-
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favoring the defendant, and discovery will not (likely) change matters, 
then no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff under the applicable 
proof rules. Dismissing the claim will thus align the outcome with the 
proof rules—fostering the goals of accuracy, fair allocation of the risk of 
error, and efficiency. By contrast, if the plaintiff’s allegations raise a rea-
sonable expectation that discovery will make the claim more plausible, 
then the complaint ought to proceed. At this early stage in the process, 
if there is such an expectation, then it is too early to tell whether a rea-
sonable jury could find for the plaintiff. Dismissing a case under these 
circumstances will risk frustrating the goals of the proof rules by elimi-
nating procedurally accurate claims and producing outcomes that do 
not align with the proof rules. In terms of the underlying procedural 
values, this will frustrate accuracy and shift an additional, unjustified risk 
of error onto plaintiffs.222 
 At summary judgment and with JMOL, nonmoving plaintiffs need 
to show that a reasonable jury could find their explanations of the evi-
dence and events to be a better explanation than those favoring the 
defendant.223 Moving plaintiffs would have to show that any reasonable 
                                                                                                                      
ship). This is also consistent with a dynamic conception of Rule 8 that adapts to changes in 
litigation contexts. See Allen & Guy, supra note 15. This, however, does not mean that the 
meaning of “plausibility” shifts. Similar concerns arise with the issue of certification for 
proposed class actions, and these concerns are also accommodated within the framework 
developed here. Proposed class actions will sometimes depend on claims that shared evi-
dence is sufficient to prove common issues under the applicable legal standards, and they 
will sometimes depend on disguised claims to change underlying legal standards. See Rich-
ard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 111–23 
(2009) (discussing potential dangers when the latter is the case). Whether a proposed class 
action depends on a change in, or a controversial interpretation of, the underlying sub-
stantive law ought to be considered by judges at the class-certification stage; otherwise, the 
same standards ought to apply as to whether a complaint is plausible, whether it raises a 
reasonable expectation of producing favorable evidence, or whether shared evidence is 
sufficient to survive summary judgment. See id. at 130–33 (arguing that certification ques-
tions that turn on the sufficiency of the evidence should be resolved at summary judgment 
and questions that turn on interpretations of the substantive law should be resolved at the 
class-certification stage). 
222 It will also frustrate other important procedural values, including participation and 
the right to a jury, deterrence, and guidance with regard to the substantive law. 
223 This assumes the preponderance rule applies. Defendants would thus argue that a 
reasonable jury could not find plaintiffs’ explanations to be better. Under the clear and 
convincing evidence rule, plaintiffs would argue that a reasonable jury could find their 
explanations to be clearly and convincingly better, and defendants would argue that a 
reasonable jury could not find plaintiffs’ explanation to be much better than defendants’ 
(even if, perhaps, they could find plaintiffs’ explanation to be slightly better). In other 
words, the defendant is entitled to judgment when a reasonable jury would have to find 
(1) defendant’s explanation is better, or (2) the explanations are even, or (3) plaintiff’s 
explanation is better, but only slightly better. See McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 355 (7th 
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jury must find their explanations to be better.224 These standards would 
align outcomes with the proof rules and serve the underlying values of 
accuracy and fair allocation of the risk of error. A higher or lower stan-
dard at these stages would fail to align outcomes with the proof rules, 
frustrate procedural accuracy, and shift an additional, unjustified risk of 
error onto one side.225 
 This concludes the outline of the theory of procedural accuracy.226 
In the next Part, examples are provided to test the theory and explore 
its implications.227 The theory is also further integrated into existing 
doctrine, and several potential counterarguments are considered.228 
III. Applying and Testing the Theory of Procedural Accuracy 
 The implications of the theory of procedural accuracy can readily 
be explored using a number of cases and examples. In exploring these 
implications, the theory is integrated with current doctrine and case 
law, and the relationship between the analysis and normative considera-
tions underlying the system of civil litigation is explained.229 Four hypo-
thetical examples are used to illustrate the procedural accuracy stan-
dards at each procedural stage.230 These examples were chosen because 
of their prevalence in discussions of the procedural issues and their 
prevalence and importance in federal civil litigation, and because the 
different types of issues provide a general overview of the procedural 
issues as a whole.231 
 The examples focus on the substantive areas of negligence, em-
ployment discrimination, antitrust, and municipal liability. 
                                                                                                                      
Cir. 2000) (characterizing the clear and convincing rule as “where all close cases go to the 
defendant”). 
224 This again assumes the preponderance rule applies. Defendants would thus argue 
that a reasonable jury could find their explanations at least as good, if not better, than 
plaintiffs’ explanations. Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, plaintiffs 
would argue that a reasonable jury must find their explanations clearly and convincingly 
better. Defendants would argue that a reasonable jury could find their explanations better, 
equal to, or only slightly worse than plaintiffs’ explanations. 
225 When there is doubt about whether a jury verdict aligns with the proof rules, the 
judge may grant a motion for a new trial. See supra note 128. 
226 See supra notes 158–225 and accompanying text. 
227 See infra notes 229–275 and accompanying text. 
228 See infra notes 276–377 and accompanying text. 
229 See infra notes 230–377 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra notes 232–234 and accompanying text. 
231 They also illustrate applications among cases with varying levels of complexity and 
cost. 
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 Example 1 (negligence): Plaintiff brings a claim for negligence, 
alleging that Defendant’s negligent driving caused an auto-
mobile accident in which Plaintiff suffered serious injuries.232 
 Example 2 (employment discrimination): Plaintiff brings a claim 
for employment discrimination against her employer under 
Title VII, alleging that she was fired because of her sex. 
 Example 3 (antitrust): Plaintiffs bring a class action claim al-
leging that Defendants, three large grocery store chains, con-
spired to fix prices on certain products in certain markets. The 
complaint alleges that in areas without “discount” grocery re-
tailers, the three defendants maintained consistently higher 
prices on several items than in areas with a discount store.233 
 Example 4 (municipal liability): Plaintiffs bring a claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipality, alleging that the plain-
tiffs were arrested for violating a local ordinance that prohibits 
the selling of goods in a local park without a license because of 
an unconstitutional policy or custom of the police to arrest only 
Muslim artists or those displaying pro-Islamic-themed art.234 
A. Pleadings 
 A civil complaint generally requires “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”235 and defen-
dants may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.”236 The requirement of a short and plain 
statement serves a number of uncontroversial functions: it provides no-
tice to defendants of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 
which the claim rests; it frames the legal issues to determine whether the 
allegations, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to legal relief under the 
                                                                                                                      
232 Form 11 in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
the following example of an adequate complaint for negligence: “2. On [Date], at [Place], 
the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 
11; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illus-
trate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”). 
233 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007) (involving a price fix-
ing conspiracy claim). 
234 See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting a “heightened pleading” standard for municipal liability 
claims). 
235 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
236 Id. 12(b)(6). 
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applicable substantive law;237 and it allows courts to determine whether 
claim or issue preclusion applies because of a prior judgment.238 More 
controversially, this requirement now authorizes a screening function to 
dismiss claims that are not plausible.239 
 According to the theory of procedural accuracy, the screening 
function ought to align outcomes with the requirements of the proof 
rules. The previous Part provided the following standard: plaintiffs will 
satisfy the plausibility threshold by pleading a claim that provides a 
plausible explanation of the relevant events that would entitle the 
plaintiff to relief.240 If, however, a reasonable jury would find that an 
alternative, equally plausible explanation of the events exists that would 
not entitle the plaintiff to relief, then the claim ought to be dismissed 
unless the plaintiff’s allegations “raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence” rendering plaintiff’s claim more plausi-
ble than the competing explanation.241 
 In applying this standard, courts are to accept as true the factual 
allegations in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences from those 
facts in favor of the plaintiff. Three features of this standard should be 
emphasized: the meaning of “plausible,” the comparative nature of the 
assessment, and the potential role of discovery. First, an explanation of 
the relevant events is plausible when it provides a tentative, acceptable 
account of the disputed events. More than one explanation of the 
events may each be plausible, even when they are inconsistent with each 
other.242 So long as, given what is known about the events, the explana-
                                                                                                                      
237 One uncontroversial reason to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim is 
when the factual allegations, even if true, do not describe conduct giving rise to legal li-
ability. 
238 These are the functions envisioned by Judge Charles Clark, the principal architect 
and advocate of minimal “notice” pleading. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 
F.R.D. 456, 457 (1941). 
239 According to Professor Robert G. Bone, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly decision appears to impose a “thin” screening model that aims to elimi-
nate only “truly meritless suits,” but its 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal appears to impose a 
“thick” model that aims to screen “weak lawsuits” as well. See Bone, Plausibility, supra note 8, 
at 849–50. It is not clear, however, whether “merit” is defined in terms of material or pro-
cedural accuracy. 
240 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
242 Although “plausibility” obviously has important connections with probability or likeli-
hood, it is a distinct notion. A failure to appreciate this point may be causing some of the 
confusion created by Bell Atlantic’s use of “plausible.” See 550 U.S. at 556. Judgments about 
cardinal probabilities obey the axioms of the probability calculus. For example, if the prob-
ability of a proposition, P, is 0.6, then the probability of the negation of that proposition, not-
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tion seems like it could be true, then the explanation is plausible.243 
Second, explanations are “defeasible” in the sense that an apparently 
plausible explanation may be rendered implausible by new information 
or by an alternative, contradictory explanation that better explains the 
events and is thus more likely.244 Finally, because new evidence may alter 
the comparative plausibility assessment, a seemingly implausible claim 
ought to proceed when a plaintiff’s complaint “raises a reasonable ex-
pectation that discovery will reveal evidence” favoring the plausibility of 
plaintiff’s claim.245 
1. Applications of the Pleading Standard 
 These three aspects of pleadings explain the results in the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and its 
2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.246 Although the alleged conspiracy in 
Bell Atlantic may have been a plausible explanation of the defendants’ 
alleged conduct in the absence of any other explanations, there was an 
“obvious alternative” explanation—independent parallel conduct—that 
                                                                                                                      
P, is 0.4 (i.e., P + not-P = 1). Plausibilistic judgments need not conform in this way. As Douglas 
Walton explains, “[b]oth a proposition and its negation can be plausible”: 
To say something is plausible means that it seems to be true based on appear-
ances. It is even more plausible if it is consistent with other propositions that 
seem to be true. It can be even more plausible if it is tested by experiment. A 
plausible inference is one that can be drawn from the given apparent facts in 
a case suggesting a particular conclusion that seems to be true. 
Walton, supra note 212, at 35. Plausible reasoning, however, is “defeasible” in that propo-
sitions that seem plausible may be defeated by new information. See infra note 244. 
243 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
244 Reasoning based on plausibility and defeasibility follows a non-monotonic logic. For a 
useful introduction and discussion, see G. Aldo Antonelli, Non-monotonic Logic, Stan. Ency-
clopedia of Phil. (Apr. 14, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-nonmonotonic/. 
The term “non-monotonic logic” covers a family of formal frameworks 
devised to capture and represent defeasible inference, i.e., that kind of inference 
of everyday life in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the 
right to retract them in the light of further information. Such inferences are 
called “non-monotonic” because the set of conclusions warranted on the basis 
of a given knowledge base, given as a set of premises, does not increase (in 
fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. 
Id. For discussions of defeasibility in law, see Douglas Walton, Witness Testimony Evidence, 
Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence, and Law 29–33 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Is 
Defeasibility an Essential Property in Law?, in Law & Defeasibility ( J. Ferrer et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1403284 (“Defeasibility is 
widespread in law”). 
245 See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556; see also supra note 221. 
246 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009); Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570. 
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was at least as good (if not better).247 Thus, there was no apparent way, 
based on the information alleged, for a reasonable jury to conclude 
that the plaintiffs’ explanation was better, even when the factual allega-
tions are assumed to be true and reasonable inferences are drawn in 
favor of the plaintiffs.248 Moreover, the allegations failed to raise “a rea-
sonable expectation” that discovery would reveal evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could find the illegal-agreement explanation to be 
more plausible than the independent-parallel-conduct explanation.249 
 Similar analysis applies to Iqbal.250 Intentional discrimination by the 
defendants may be a plausible explanation for their conduct toward the 
plaintiff (and others) in the absence of any other plausible explana-
tions.251 But there was an “obvious alternative” explanation that ex-
plained the defendants’ conduct at least as well (if not better)— “non-
discriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the 
United States and who had potential connections to those who commit-
ted terrorist acts.”252 Thus, there was no apparent way for a reasonable 
jury to conclude the plaintiff’s explanation was better.253 Nor did the 
factual allegations raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would 
reveal evidence rendering the intentional discrimination explanation 
more plausible.254 
 By contrast, consider two other recent cases in which the Court 
held complaints to be sufficient.255 In 2007 in Erickson v. Pardus, de-
cided shortly after Bell Atlantic, the U.S. Supreme Court held sufficient 
a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim that he was being denied neces-
sary medical treatment for hepatitis C, and that this denial was endan-
gering his life.256 The complaint was deemed sufficient because it pro-
vided a plausible account of the relevant events, one that a reasonable 
jury could find better than any alternative explanations.257 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                      
247 See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 567. 
248 See id. 
249 Id. at 556; see also supra note 221. 
250 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947–54. 
251 See id. 
252 Id. at 1951. 
253 See id. 
254 See id. The Court noted that even “controlled” or limited discovery would put a 
burden on the defendants and that this burden was unjustified given the generality of the 
factual allegations. Id. at 1952–54. 
255 See infra notes 256, 258 and accompanying text. 
256 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–95 (2007). 
257 Id. at 94. 
The complaint stated that Dr. Bloor’s decision to remove petitioner from his 
prescribed hepatitis C medication was “endangering [his] life.” It alleged this 
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even if the defendants offered an alternative explanation as part of a 
motion to dismiss, a reasonable jury could still have found the plain-
tiff’s explanation to be more plausible, assuming the factual allegations 
in the complaint were true. 
 Similar analysis applies to the 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,258 an employment discrimination case 
cited favorably in both Bell Atlantic and Erickson.259 The Court held the 
complaint was sufficient when the plaintiff provided details leading up 
to his termination, the relevant dates, and the names and nationalities 
of the people involved.260 Consistent with the Court’s statement in Bell 
Atlantic that Rule 8 does not impose a “probability” requirement, in nei-
ther Erickson nor Swierkiewicz did the Court assess the probability or like-
lihood of success by the plaintiff at trial.261 The complaints were suffi-
cient because they provided plausible accounts that a reasonable jury 
could find better than any alternative explanation of the relevant 
events and evidence.262 
 Turning to the examples from the beginning of this Part, in the 
first example (negligence), the plaintiff will satisfy the pleading standard 
by providing the relevant date and location of the accident along with 
an allegation that the defendant’s negligent driving caused the acci-
dent.263 More details about how the defendant was negligent are not 
                                                                                                                      
medication was withheld “shortly after” petitioner had commenced a treat-
ment program that would take one year, that he was “still in need of treat-
ment for this disease,” and that the prison officials were in the meantime re-
fusing to provide treatment. This alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). 
Id. (citation omitted). It is not even clear yet what the alternative explanations might be. 
See id. 
258 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). 
259 See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93–94; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555–56. 
260 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514. 
[P]etitioner’s complaint easily satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a) because 
it gives respondent fair notice of the basis for petitioner’s claims. Petitioner 
alleged that he had been terminated on account of his national origin in vio-
lation of Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the ADEA. His 
complaint detailed the events leading to his termination, provided relevant 
dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant 
persons involved with his termination. 
Id. 
261 See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93–95; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–14. 
262 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (“A requirement of greater specificity for particular 
claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and 
not by judicial interpretation.’”). 
263 This satisfies Form 11 in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. See supra note 232. 
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necessary. Negligent driving by the defendant provides a plausible ex-
planation that a reasonable jury could find to be a better explanation of 
the events than explanations favoring the defendant. Even if the defen-
dant were to provide an alternative explanation (for example, the plain-
tiff’s or a third party’s negligent driving caused the accident) as part of a 
motion to dismiss, a reasonable jury could still find the plaintiff’s expla-
nation to be better given the factual allegations in the complaint. More-
over, there may be a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
additional information bearing on the negligence question.264 
 With the second example (employment discrimination), consis-
tent with Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff will satisfy the pleading standard by 
providing the relevant details and dates regarding her employment and 
termination, along with an allegation that she was discharged because 
of her sex.265 That she was discharged because of sex provides a plausi-
ble explanation of the relevant events; at this point, a reasonable jury 
may be able to find it the best available explanation at trial. The defen-
dant may counter with a non-discriminatory explanation, but at the 
pleading stage, even when faced with an alternative defense explana-
tion, the complaint will still be sufficient if a reasonable jury could find 
the plaintiff’s explanation is better given the factual allegations in the 
complaint.266 
 The third example (antitrust) is similar to Bell Atlantic.267 Although 
a conspiracy to fix prices may explain the pricing patterns among the 
stores, the alternative explanation of independent parallel conduct is a 
just as good (if not better) explanation of the relevant events.268 There-
fore, at this point the complaint is not plausible because a reasonable 
jury could not find that conspiracy is more plausible than independent 
conduct.269 Moreover, as in Bell Atlantic, the complaint does not yet pro-
vide enough information to raise a reasonable expectation that discov-
                                                                                                                      
264 For example, depositions of the parties and any available witnesses may provide this 
expectation. 
265 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508; Dolgaleva v. Va. Beach City Pub. Schs., 364 F. App’x 
820, 826–27 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Swierkiewcz and finding the pleading standard satisfied 
in a national origin discrimination case where the plaintiff’s complaint named the defen-
dant and the date of her job application, alleged she was the most qualified applicant, and 
alleged she was told her national origin was held against her in the hiring decision). 
266 The plaintiff will likely have to respond to the defendant’s alternative explanation 
at summary judgment or JMOL. See infra notes 312–377 and accompanying text. 
267 See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 548. 
268 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Inc., 475 U.S. 574, 585–93 
(1986) (involving an alleged conspiracy to fix prices of television sets sold in Japan, and to 
fix and maintain low prices for the sets exported and sold in the United States). 
269 See id. This is a consequence of substantive antitrust law. See id. 
1492 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1451 
ery will reveal evidence rendering the conspiracy explanation more 
plausible than independent conduct.270 The complaint would raise this 
reasonable expectation by providing more details about the nature of 
the conspiracy, how it could be verified, where the relevant conversa-
tions took place, and so on.271 
 The fourth example (municipal liability) is more straightforward.272 
Assuming the factual allegations are true, the complaint provides a plau-
sible explanation of the relevant events (i.e., the arrests).273 Unlike Iqbal 
(and Bell Atlantic), there does not appear to be an alternative explanation 
that explains the events as well.274 If one is proffered as part of a motion 
to dismiss (e.g., the police arrest everyone without a license, regardless of 
religion), a reasonable jury could still find that the plaintiffs’ explanation 
better explains the relevant events. Moreover, the complaint raises a rea-
sonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence bearing on the 
plausibility of the plaintiffs’ explanation (and any competing explana-
tions), including information about the number of arrests and details 
about those arrested.275 
2. Counterarguments to Analysis of the Pleading Standard 
 One might challenge the analysis of the pleading standard on de-
scriptive or normative grounds: either the standard applied does not 
adequately capture the “plausibility” requirement or it is not what the 
“plausibility” requirement ought to be.276 In either case, one might ob-
ject that the standard employed is too weak or too strong. Each of these 
potential counterarguments is responded to below.277 
a. The Procedural Accuracy Standard May Be Too Weak 
 One may argue that, descriptively, the procedural accuracy stan-
dard is too weak. Recent scholarship suggests that it might be. In at-
tempting to articulate the plausibility standard, a number of scholars 
have argued that the standard is substantially similar to the standard for 
                                                                                                                      
270 See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570. 
271 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
272 See infra notes 273–275 and accompanying text. 
273 See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167 (holding municipal liability complaint to be suffi-
cient based on allegations of the particular incidents giving rise to allegedly unconstitu-
tional conduct). 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
276 See infra notes 278–311 and accompanying text. 
277 See infra notes 278–311 and accompanying text. 
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summary judgment (or perhaps even higher).278 In other words, a 
complaint states a “plausible” claim only if a reasonable jury could find 
for the plaintiff based on what is known at the time of the pleadings.279 
But such a standard would be incorrect for two related reasons. First, 
the Court has already explained that the pleading standards of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act (the “PSLRA”),280 which are 
higher than Rule 8, are lower than the summary judgment standard.281 
For example, the standard for pleading scienter under the PSLRA is as 
follows: “A complaint will survive, we hold, only if a reasonable person 
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling 
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”282 
Because this standard is lower than the summary judgment standard, 
and the Rule 8 requirements are lower still, then a fortiori the Rule 8 
pleading standard must be lower than the summary judgment stan-
dard.283 Second, such a standard would ignore the role that discovery 
may play in rendering a claim more plausible. As the Court explained 
in Bell Atlantic, even a claim that may seem, at the pleading stage, to be 
less plausible than an alternative explanation may still survive a motion 
to dismiss if the allegations suggest a “reasonable expectation” that dis-
covery will reveal evidence rendering the claim plausible.284 
                                                                                                                      
278 See generally Epstein, supra note 8; Hylton, supra note 8; Spencer, Understanding, su-
pra note 8; Thomas, New Summary, supra note 8. 
279 See Epstein, supra note 8, at 82 (“[T]he Supreme Court and the District Court 
treated the defendant’s motion to dismiss as though it set up a ‘mini-summary judgment’ 
that is available solely when the plaintiff relies on public information and its ostensible 
economic implications.”); Thomas, New Summary, supra note 8, at 41 (“The motion to dis-
miss is now the new summary judgment motion, in standard and possibly effect.”). Profes-
sor A. Benjamin Spencer provides a descriptive standard (the “presumption of impropri-
ety” standard) that is even higher than the summary judgment standard: “if lawful reasons 
could explain factual occurrences reported in a complaint just as well as unlawful ones 
might, no such showing of entitlement has been made.” Spencer, Understanding, supra note 
8, at 15 (emphasis added). Under this standard, plaintiffs would have to show not only that 
a reasonable jury could find their explanation to be more plausible (the standard at sum-
mary judgment), but would also have to make the more difficult showing that a reasonable 
jury could not find a pro-defendant explanation at least as plausible. See id. In other words, 
plaintiffs would need to show, based on what is known at the pleading stage, not only that 
they could survive summary judgment but that they are entitled to summary judgment. See 
id. 
280 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
281 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321 (2007). 
282 Id. at 324 (emphasis added). 
283 See id. Professor Bone also notes the lower standard in Bell Atlantic: “It is also clear 
that the Court does not mean to impose a standard as strict as . . . [the PSLRA] requires 
for scienter allegations . . . .” Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 8, at 881 n.42. 
284 Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556. 
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b. The Procedural Accuracy Standard Should Be Stronger 
 Even if the procedural accuracy standard is descriptively accurate, 
perhaps the standard ought to be stronger.285 For example, Professor 
Richard Epstein has argued in favor of applying the summary judgment 
standard at the pleading stage in antitrust cases similar to Bell Atlan-
tic.286 But, as a general matter, applying this standard is normatively 
problematic because it potentially disrupts the underlying values ex-
pressed by the trial proof rules regarding accuracy and fairness.287 
Plaintiffs who must provide more than a plausible explanation of the 
events, or suggest a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
favorable evidence, will necessarily bear a greater risk of error.288 Given 
the comparative nature of proof, this is particularly unfair in cases in 
which we do not yet know the defendant’s alternative explanation. A 
stronger standard will also lead to additional procedural errors (and 
thus potential material errors) whenever a complaint is dismissed and 
the plaintiff’s explanation at trial would have been better than the ex-
planations that favor the defendant.289 
                                                                                                                      
285 See infra notes 286–288 and accompanying text. 
286 Epstein, supra note 8, at 99 (“[W]hen the full record at the time of the motion to 
dismiss does not support any plausible factual inference of guilt, then it is time to invoke a 
mini-summary judgment under the guise of a motion to dismiss.”). Professor Epstein ar-
gues that cases ought to proceed only when “the likelihood of a positive case is high 
enough to justify” discovery costs. Id. at 81. By “positive,” he is apparently referring to ma-
terial accuracy. See id.; see also id. at 68 (expressing concern for “false positives” over false 
negatives); Hylton, supra note 8, at 54 (“In any case in which there is considerable doubt as 
to whether the plaintiff will be able to survive summary judgment, . . . the courts should 
dismiss at the pleading stage.”). 
287 It would also frustrate other important procedural values such as participation. 
288 Professor Epstein contends that the costs are likely to be asymmetrical in antitrust 
cases and that there are therefore good reasons to treat false positives as more serious than 
false negatives. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 68. If this is true, then as a matter of policy it 
may justify raising the proof rule to “clear and convincing evidence.” As things currently 
stand, however, the applicability of the preponderance rule suggests that the risk of error 
ought to be allocated to the parties in a roughly even manner. Additionally, requiring 
plaintiffs to meet the summary judgment standard at two stages, while defendants have to 
meet it, at most, at one stage, will shift more of the risk of error onto plaintiffs. One could 
perhaps implement Professor Epstein’s proposal at the pleading stage, however—while 
maintaining a roughly equal allocation of the risk error—by either precluding defendants 
(but not plaintiffs) from moving for summary judgment or by lowering plaintiffs’ burden 
of persuasion at trial and placing the burden of persuasion on defendants. 
289 Professor Epstein contends that the summary judgment standard should apply 
when the allegations are based on “public information.” Id. at 82. The “public informa-
tion” requirement, however, precludes discovery when discovery might render what ap-
pears to be an implausible explanation (based on the public information) plausible. See id. 
This is an additional risk borne asymmetrically by plaintiffs. Cases with high discovery costs 
could, nonetheless, require more to raise a reasonable expectation. See supra note 221. 
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c. The Procedural Accuracy Standard Is Too Strong 
 Perhaps the proposed standard is too strong, either descriptively or 
normatively. A recent article by Professor Adam Steinman suggests that 
both may be the case.290 According to Professor Steinman, the “conven-
tional wisdom” that Bell Atlantic and Iqbal impose a plausibility require-
ment is wrong as a descriptive matter.291 He contends that the problem 
with the complaints was that they were “conclusory,” and that “plausibil-
ity” may be a way to save a conclusory complaint but not a way to dis-
miss a non-conclusory complaint.292 For example, he argues that the 
complaint in Bell Atlantic alleged conduct consistent with an agreement 
but did not “contain ‘an independent allegation of the actual agree-
ment.’”293 Likewise, in Iqbal—where the complaint alleged that (1) 
Ashcroft and Mueller approved of the policy to subject the plaintiff to 
the alleged detention conditions because of religion and national ori-
gin, (2) Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the policy, and (3) 
Mueller was “instrumental” in implementing it—Professor Steinman 
contends the agreement was a “distinct” event and the complaint failed 
because it did not allege sufficient details about the content of this 
agreement.294 The failure of both complaints was that they described 
the goals or future consequences of agreements without identifying the 
nature or contents of the agreements themselves.295 
 Professor Steinman’s reading of these cases is provocative and an 
important challenge to the “conventional interpretation” of the plead-
ing cases, but it does not stand up to close scrutiny. The idea of “conclu-
sory” allegations cannot support the weight it is being asked to bear.296 
Professor Steinman proposes defining “conclusory” in “transactional” 
terms: an action is conclusory when it “fails to identify what real world 
events are alleged to have occurred.”297 But anyone reading either com-
plaint would know to what real world events the plaintiffs are referring: 
an agreement not to compete in Bell Atlantic and a policy to discriminate 
in Iqbal.298 It is not clear how merely saying “agreement” (as opposed to 
                                                                                                                      
290 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1293. 
291 See id. at 1298. 
292 Id. (“[C]onclusoriness is a basis for refusing to accept the truth of an allegation; im-
plausibility is not.” (emphasis added)). 
293 See id. at 1339. 
294 See id. at 1337. 
295 See id. at 1335–39. 
296 Allegations are “conclusory” when they are too general to provide a plausible ex-
planation of the relevant events. See supra note 72. 
297 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1339. 
298 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 548. 
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“conspiracy”) in the complaint in Bell Atlantic would make it any less 
conclusory.299 Nor is it clear how saying, shortly after September 11, 
2001, that Ashcroft and Mueller approved of “subject[ing] Plaintiffs to 
[harsh] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy solely” because 
of their religion and national origin is any less conclusory than saying 
that one designed and the other implemented a policy with these effects 
for these reasons.300 Moreover, a number of satisfactory examples of 
complaints are similarly “conclusory” and would fail the transactional 
standard. The complaint in Swierkiewicz, for example, described “under-
lying acts or events” — “the plaintiff’s firing.”301 But, like Iqbal, this is sim-
ply the future consequence of a prior action (the decision to fire plain-
tiff because of age), and the complaint does not describe the content of 
that decision.302 And, as in Iqbal and Bell Atlantic, the reason for the fu-
ture action is what matters for purposes of the substantive law. Similarly, 
Form 11 describes the defendant’s negligent driving but does not allege 
what this defendant did that was negligent.303 
                                                                                                                      
299 Along with a “conspiracy” to restrain trade, the Sherman Act also mentions “con-
tract[s]” to restrain trade as giving rise to liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). If the complaint in 
Bell Atlantic had said “contract” rather than “conspiracy,” it would have been just as conclu-
sory. Thus, it is hard to see how “having an agreement” is less conclusory than “having a 
contract” (which implies an agreement—and more). 
300 See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1336. As Steinman notes, the complaint alleged that the 
defendant “agreed to subject Plaintiffs to [harsh] conditions” and did so “solely on account 
of their religion, race, and / or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Id. 
at 1308 & n.97. The complaint used “agreed,” which Professor Steinman contends was the 
problem in Bell Atlantic, and it makes clear both the nature of the policy and the reasons for 
it. See id. at 1339. 
301 Id. at 1299 n.17 (citing generally Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506). 
302 See id. at 1342 (“Swierkiewicz did not need to explain why he believed the defendant 
fired him for invidious reasons.”). For example, the complaint does not allege the contents 
of the employer’s thoughts when he decided to fire the plaintiff, nor does it allege the 
content of the words spoken if the decision was made as part of a conversation. But, if this 
content does not matter, why should similar content of the agreement in Bell Atlantic or 
policy in Iqbal matter? 
303 Professor Steinman contends Form 11 is sufficient because it describes the fact that 
“the defendant drove his car against the plaintiff.” Id. at 1341. But this does not itself give rise 
to liability, and adding an allegation that the defendant was driving “negligently” would fail 
under Professor Steinman’s definition of “conclusory.” The complaint does not yet describe 
what the defendant did to make his conduct negligent. See id. at 1343 n.287 (arguing that the 
complaint in Iqbal is insufficient because of “uncertainty about Ashcroft and Mueller’s indi-
vidual involvement in a willful and malicious agreement to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions 
of confinement”). More generally, Professor Steinman contends that if a complaint identifies 
the “transactional core” of an event, “it does not need to further explain how or why an event 
is alleged to have a particular quality or characteristic.” Id. at 1341. 
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d. The Procedural Accuracy Standard Is Too Strong from a Normative  
Perspective 
 Putting aside descriptive exegesis, a final counterargument to the 
procedural accuracy standard is that it is too strong from a normative 
perspective.304 Professor Steinman’s analysis also suggests such a 
counterargument. He explores “a deeper theory of the role pleadings 
ought to play in civil adjudication” and arrives at “a new paradigm” that 
he refers to as “plain pleading.”305 The “deeper theory” aspect aims at 
satisfying the pleading functions of “notice-giving, process-facilitating, 
and merits-screening,”306 and the “plain pleading” standard requires 
that allegations “necessary to establish a viable claim” must “identify a 
tangible, real-world act or event.”307 Under this standard, courts need 
not accept conclusory allegations as true because, if they did, it would 
be “impossible to determine whether the acts or events . . . would even 
establish a viable claim.”308 Any higher pleading standard, however, 
would prevent “meritorious claims from ever seeing the light of day” or 
would “prevent[] plaintiffs with potentially meritorious claims from 
reaching” further stages in the adjudicative process.309 Yet, from a nor-
mative perspective, this proposed paradigm is problematic. A standard 
of whether it is “impossible” to tell whether a claim is without merit or 
whether a claim is “potentially meritorious”310 would fail to align deci-
sions at this stage with the proof rules, would shift more of the risk of 
error onto defendants, and would eliminate any efficiency benefits 
when one outcome is dictated by the proof rules. It would therefore 
risk a greater number of procedural errors (and hence material errors) 
than the procedural accuracy standard.311 
                                                                                                                      
304 See infra notes 305–311 and accompanying text. 
305 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1347, 1348–49. 
306 Id. at 1347. 
307 Id. at 1339. The complaints in Iqbal and Bell Atlantic alleged real-world events, e.g., a 
policy toward detainees and an agreement not to compete. 
308 Id. at 1349. 
309 Id. at 1350–51. 
310 See id. at 1350–51. It is not clear whether “meritorious” refers to material or proce-
dural accuracy. See id. Either way, however, a standard based on the possibility of recovery 
reduces to the rejected Conley standard. See id. 
311 In terms of procedural values, this standard trades efficiency for participation, but, 
more importantly, it ignores the considerations regarding accuracy and allocation of the 
risk. In these regards, it is the inverse of Professor Epstein’s proposed standard. See Ep-
stein, supra note 8, at 98–99. 
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B. Summary Judgment 
 A court may grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.”312 There is a genuine issue of material fact 
when a reasonable jury could find for either party at trial on that issue; 
there is no genuine issue when “there can be but one reasonable con-
clusion.”313 The reasonable jury determination (1) is based on informa-
tion about the case contained in “pleadings, the discovery and disclo-
sure material on file, and any affidavits,”314 and (2) “necessarily impli-
cates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at 
the trial on the merits.”315 In other words, the determination involves an 
assessment of what a reasonable jury could do given the evidence in the 
record and the applicable burdens of proof and decision standard at 
trial. The assessment takes place without judging the credibility of wit-
nesses and by drawing reasonable inferences and construing any ambi-
guities or conflicts in the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.316 
 The theory of procedural accuracy provides criteria for answering 
the crucial, but often elided, summary judgment question: when is a 
particular jury conclusion reasonable (or unreasonable) given the evi-
dence in the record and the applicable proof rules? As a general matter, 
this question ought to turn on whether a reasonable jury could or must 
find a particular explanation to be the best available explanation. When 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and the defendant moves for summary judgment, judgment 
should be entered only if a reasonable jury could not find the plaintiff’s 
explanation to be better than any available explanations that favor the 
defendant.317 When the plaintiff moves for summary judgment, judg-
ment should be entered only if a reasonable jury must find the plaintiff’s 
explanation to be better than those that favor the defendant. Under the 
theory of procedural accuracy, this standard would align applications of 
summary judgment with the macro-level rules of the trial—thereby fos-
tering material accuracy and maintaining a proper balance regarding 
the risk of error—while guiding and constraining applications. 
                                                                                                                      
312 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 
313 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 
314 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 
315 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
316 See id. 
317 Under the clear and convincing evidence rule, a reasonable jury would have to be 
able to find the plaintiff’s explanation to be clearly and convincingly better. 
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1. Applications of the Summary Judgment Standard 
 The standard provided by the theory of procedural accuracy ex-
plains and justifies a number of aspects of three U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions decided in 1986: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, and Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.318 
 Anderson established that summary judgment determinations de-
pend on the “evidentiary standard of proof” that would apply at trial.319 
This means that a reasonable inference under the preponderance 
standard may not be reasonable under the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard. From the perspective of procedural accuracy, this is 
exactly right. A lower standard—one that did not incorporate the trial 
proof rule—would create the risk of procedural errors because some 
claims would make it past summary judgment even though a contrary 
outcome would be mandated by the trial proof rules.320 
 Celotex rejected the requirement that parties moving for summary 
judgment who would not have the burden of proof at trial (typically de-
fendants) must offer evidence tending to disprove the nonmoving par-
ties’ (typically plaintiffs’) allegations.321 This rejection is consistent with 
the theory of procedural accuracy: placing a higher burden on moving 
parties than they would bear at trial creates the opportunity for proce-
dural errors by allowing cases to proceed through the litigation process 
when one outcome is mandated by the trial proof rules.322 The outcome 
in Celotex is also consistent.323 At trial the plaintiff needed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was exposed to the defendant’s 
asbestos.324 In terms of procedural accuracy, to avoid summary judg-
ment plaintiff therefore needed to show that a reasonable jury could find 
that exposure to the defendant’s asbestos better explained his cancer 
than any explanation that favored the defendant (for example, expo-
                                                                                                                      
318 See infra notes 319–329 and accompanying text. 
319 477 U.S. at 252. The opinion also explained that courts must draw legitimate and 
justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and that they must not judge the 
credibility of witnesses. See id. 
320 Of course, sometimes the jury would still render the decision dictated by the proof 
rules, or a later procedural device ( JMOL) could align the outcome with the proof rules. 
When the possible procedural error is avoided, however, any potential efficiency gained by 
summary judgment would be lost. 
321 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986) (“[W]e find no express or 
implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or 
other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”). 
322 See id. 
323 See id. 
324 See id. 
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sure to someone else’s asbestos or a different cause).325 On remand, the 
appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficient evidence in 
the record to withstand the defendant’s motion.326 In other words, it 
concluded that a reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s explanation 
to be the best available explanation. 
 By focusing explicitly on competing explanations, Matsushita also 
accords with the theory of procedural accuracy. At trial, the plaintiff 
would have been required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendants conspired to fix prices.327 Thus, the plaintiff would 
have been required to prove that its explanation of the evidence and 
events was better than the available explanations that favored defen-
dants. Accordingly, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff would 
have had to show that a reasonable jury could have found its explana-
tion to be better than those that favored defendants. But, because the 
alleged conspiracy made “no economic sense” and the plaintiff lacked 
any evidence of a conspiracy (other than similar prices),328 no reason-
able jury could have found conspiracy to be a better explanation of the 
defendants’ actions than explanations that favored defendants, such as 
independent action. Given the lack of other evidence, a reasonable jury 
would have concluded that independent action was at least as plausible 
as a conspiracy. Because conspiracy was not the best available explana-
tion, a finding for the plaintiff would have been unreasonable. 
 The examples from the beginning of this Part further illuminate 
the standard.329 In the first example (negligence), the defendant is en-
titled to summary judgment when a reasonable jury could not find the 
defendant’s negligence to be the best available explanation of the 
events and the evidence in the record. The plaintiff is entitled to sum-
mary judgment if a reasonable jury must find it to be the best explana-
tion. In the second example (employment discrimination), summary 
judgment for the defendant is warranted when a reasonable jury could 
not find sex discrimination to be the best available explanation for the 
plaintiff’s discharge and the evidence in the record. Summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff is warranted when a reasonable jury must find it 
                                                                                                                      
325 Defendants must satisfy an initial burden either by pointing out the absence of 
plaintiff evidence, such that a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff, or by submit-
ting additional evidence showing a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff. See, e.g., 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). 
326 See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
327 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585–93. 
328 See id. at 587–93. 
329 See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text. 
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to be the best explanation. In the third example (antitrust), summary 
judgment for the defendant ought to be granted when a reasonable 
jury could not find conspiracy to be the best available explanation of the 
events and evidence in the record. Summary judgment ought to be 
granted for the plaintiff when a reasonable jury must so find. Finally, in 
the fourth example (municipal liability), the defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment when a reasonable jury could not find that a policy 
or custom to arrest Muslim artists because of religion or national origin 
is the best available explanation of the events and evidence in the re-
cord. The plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment when a reason-
able jury must so find. 
2. Counterarguments to the Summary Judgment Standard 
 As with pleadings, the standard for summary judgment provided 
by the theory of procedural accuracy may be challenged on descriptive 
or normative grounds. For the reasons discussed above, however, the 
standard provides a descriptive fit with the summary judgment frame-
work established by Rule 56 and the trilogy of Anderson, Celotex, and 
Matsushita.330 Given this fit,331 it is assumed that the more serious 
counterarguments are normative—for example, that the standard ar-
ticulated is weaker or stronger than it ought to be.332 
a. The Procedural Accuracy Standard Is Too Weak Normatively 
 First, one might argue that the procedural accuracy standard is too 
weak normatively. The standard is too weak, arguably, because it relies 
on a comparison of the explanations that support each side and not on 
an examination of the strength of the plaintiff’s case in isolation. Ac-
cording to this view, there will be situations in which the plaintiff’s ex-
planation is better than the defendant’s, but the plaintiff’s case is still so 
weak (or the explanation so bad) that it should not go to trial.333 More-
                                                                                                                      
330 See supra notes 318–328 and accompanying text. 
331 As a descriptive matter, one might argue that my standard places too much of a 
burden on defendants and is thus inconsistent with Celotex, in which the Court held that 
defendants need not provide evidence disproving plaintiffs’ allegations. But nothing in my 
proposed standard requires defendants to provide either evidence or an alternative expla-
nation of plaintiffs’ evidence at summary judgment (even though the standard is phrased 
comparatively). What defendants’ obligations ought to be at summary judgment are con-
sidered in the normative discussion below. 
332 See infra notes 333–349 and accompanying text. 
333 See Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of “Sufficiency of the Evidence” 
Tests, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1113, 1121 (1991). 
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over, according to this view, the comparison standard puts too high a 
burden on the defendant, who ought to be able to sit back and do 
nothing until the plaintiff has provided a sufficiently good case to war-
rant a trial.334 
 A stronger standard, however, faces two problems that make it less 
desirable on normative grounds than the one I propose. First, if we could 
somehow measure the strength of the plaintiff’s case in isolation and 
thus require more than that a reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s 
explanation to be better than those favoring the defendant, this would 
necessarily shift more of the risk of error onto plaintiffs. A comparative 
standard better fits with the normative goals of allocating the risk of er-
ror roughly equally among the parties and maximizing material accu-
racy. Parties each share a risk that the best available explanation will fa-
vor their opponent, and, if better explanations are more likely to be 
true than worse ones, the comparative standard will provide results that 
are more likely to be materially accurate. A non-comparative standard 
will allocate the risk of error onto plaintiffs even when their explana-
tions are more likely to be accurate, and it will provide decisions that are 
less likely to be materially accurate. The second, more serious problem 
with a stronger, non-comparative standard is that it simply cannot be 
carried out in most cases.335 The nature of legal proof is inherently 
comparative,336 and, so long as the plaintiff has some evidence on each 
element of a claim, it is impossible to conclude how likely the claim is 
without comparing it to an alternative explanation, with or without 
competing evidence.337 
b. The Procedural Accuracy Standard Is Too Strong 
 One may also argue that the procedural accuracy standard is 
stronger than it ought to be. A recent article by Professor Suja Thomas 
                                                                                                                      
334 See Currie, supra note 105, at 72–79. 
335 A non-comparative standard will work only when a plaintiff has no evidence at all 
on an element. When there is some evidence, we cannot tell whether it is sufficient with-
out some comparison with the defendant’s case. 
336 This is so regardless of whether one adopts a probabilistic or explanatory concep-
tion of proof. See Walton, supra note 212, at 277 n.6 (“To say a statement is improbable 
means that it is unlikely that it is true . . . . This notion is based . . . on placing the state-
ment as one in a set of statements that are independent of each other and that together 
exhaust a set of outcomes.”). 
337 For cases recognizing this aspect, see Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 
425, 437 (2002); Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 517–24 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917, 920 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
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makes such a suggestion.338 Professor Thomas argues that the “reason-
able jury” standard is a “legal fiction,” that the questions that arise under 
it are “incapable of determination,” and that the “only analysis that 
judges perform [in applying it] is an improper one based on the judge’s 
own view of the facts.”339 This is a serious challenge to the procedural 
accuracy standard because if the reasonable jury question cannot be 
answered without devolving into the judge’s own determination of the 
underlying proof question, then a fortiori the procedural accuracy stan-
dard of what a reasonable jury could conclude about competing expla-
nations also devolves into this improper determination.340 But why does 
Professor Thomas think the reasonable jury determination is impossi-
ble? Her argument depends on the idea that “under the current stan-
dard, judges are not supposed to decide what they think about the suffi-
ciency of the evidence,”341 but any determination will necessarily involve 
“the judges’ own views of the sufficiency of the evidence in a case.”342 
 There is an ambiguity lurking here, and clarifying it will reveal that 
an independent reasonable jury determination is (1) possible, (2) one 
that judges are capable of performing, and (3) indeed, familiar. Profes-
sor Thomas is correct that judges should not decide whether the evi-
dence is “sufficient” in the sense that it actually proves the disputed is-
sue by a preponderance of the evidence, but a judge can decide 
whether the evidence is “sufficient” in the sense that a reasonable jury 
could conclude the evidence proves the issue by a preponderance of 
the evidence.343 The latter determination is not only proper but is re-
quired to apply the standard correctly. An analytical separation of these 
two questions is possible, and is a mental feat that judges are quite ca-
pable of performing.344 
                                                                                                                      
338 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 784. 
339 Id; see also id. at 777–78 (“The false factual premise underlying the reasonable jury 
standard is that a court can actually apply the standard. A court cannot do this.”). 
340 It would be “improper” in part because it would interfere with the parties’ Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial. It would also be improper normatively for the reasons 
discussed in Part II. See supra notes 132–228 and accompanying text. 
341 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 778 (relying on Anderson for this claim). 
342 Id. at 772. 
343 There is a similar ambiguity in Professor Thomas’s analysis regarding the “weighing 
of evidence” and drawing “inferences.” The judge may not weigh evidence and draw infer-
ences to determine whether the claim has been proven, but the judge may evaluate 
whether a reasonable jury could weigh the evidence and draw certain inferences and then 
conclude whether the claim has been proven. 
344 It is, of course, a different question whether they actually will do so in a given case. 
See, e.g., Scott, 550 U.S. at 386; see supra note 119. 
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 An example illustrates the difference. Suppose a witness provides 
corroborating testimony of the plaintiff’s version of events, and this tes-
timony is the plaintiff’s evidence on a necessary element of the claim. If 
the judge concludes that this witness is not believable, the judge would, 
if able to decide the case, conclude that the plaintiff has failed to prove 
the necessary element by a preponderance of the evidence. But, be-
cause judges are not supposed to weigh credibility in deciding the rea-
sonable jury question, the judge should conclude that a reasonable jury 
could believe the witness and thus that the jury could find the element 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the judge should 
deny a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff even though 
this result diverges from how she would decide the factual question. 
 This distinction is not only possible and one that judges are capa-
ble of making, it is a familiar one they perform all the time in the evi-
dence context. The admissibility of evidence often depends on proof of 
certain preliminary facts, such as whether a witness has personal 
knowledge,345 whether an exhibit is authentic,346 and general issues of 
conditional relevance.347 Judges decide these questions under the stan-
dard of whether there is evidence “sufficient to support a finding,” 
which examines whether a reasonable jury could find these preliminary 
facts proven by a preponderance of the evidence.348 Clearly, this deter-
mination may diverge from judges’ own views about whether the pre-
liminary facts are proven.349 
 Professor Thomas’s concern regarding the unconstrained nature 
of reasonable jury determinations is warranted. Due to the absence of 
criteria for applying the standard, judges are not prevented from substi-
tuting their own judgments about how they would decide the case. But 
it does not follow that a viable reasonable jury standard would not be 
possible or would not function to facilitate important procedural values 
and normative goals, if there were better guidance and constraint. In-
                                                                                                                      
345 See Fed. R. Evid. 602. 
346 See id. 901. 
347 See id. 104(b). 
348 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). 
349 When judges decide preliminary evidentiary questions themselves it is under the 
distinct (higher) standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a). See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). 
Professor Thomas also argues that the fact that judges disagree with each other about 
whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff shows that the judges are substituting 
their own views of the facts. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 772–73. But this does not follow. 
Two judges could agree on how they would decide the case, but disagree about how to 
answer a second-order question about whether a reasonable jury could disagree with their 
shared answer to the first-order question. 
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deed, the standard provided by the theory of procedural accuracy ap-
plies just these criteria in order to align decisions with normatively de-
sirable procedural values and goals. 
C. Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 JMOL may be entered against a party at trial or after a verdict 
when “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”350 As with 
summary judgment, the decision of what a reasonable jury could de-
cide depends on the substantive law, the burden of proof, and the deci-
sion rule. Courts also must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party and must not judge the credibility of witnesses.351 The 
primary difference from summary judgment is that the “reasonable 
jury” determination depends on the evidence admitted at trial. 
 Given the similar standards, the procedural accuracy considera-
tions apply similarly in both contexts to align outcomes with the proof 
rules. The requirements for moving and nonmoving parties (with and 
without the burden of proof) in the JMOL context follow the same 
comparative-explanatory framework used for summary judgment.352 
The same analysis also applies to the four hypothetical examples. Lastly, 
the counterarguments and responses regarding summary judgment 
also apply to JMOL.353 
 There is one area in which the JMOL standard has caused consid-
erable confusion: employment discrimination.354 The discussion below 
further illuminates the requirements of procedural accuracy and fo-
cuses on two recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions: St. Mary’s Honor Cen-
ter v. Hicks, a 1993 race discrimination claim,355 and Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc., a 2000 age discrimination claim.356 
 In St. Mary’s, the plaintiff alleged that he was demoted and dis-
charged from his job as a correctional officer because of race.357 Plaintiff 
                                                                                                                      
350 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Such judgments should be granted only after the party 
“has been fully heard” on the issue. See id. 
351 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 
352 See supra notes 318–329 and accompanying text. 
353 See supra notes 330–339 and accompanying text. 
354 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 34, at 429; Zimmer, supra note 34, at 577. 
355 509 U.S. 502, 504 (1993). 
356 530 U.S. at 137; see Zimmer, supra note 34, at 577 (“[T]he Supreme Court spent 
much of its opinion [in Reeves] applying the rules as to motions for summary judgment 
and judgment as a matter of law to the facts of this particular case rather than announcing 
any new rules about how this should work.”). 
357 See 509 U.S. at 504–05. 
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attempted to prove his discrimination claim through the structure estab-
lished in the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green.358 The defendants in St. Mary’s conceded that the plaintiff proved 
a prima facie case of discrimination.359 The defendants responded with 
evidence of a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for firing him: sev-
eral rules violations.360 During a bench trial, the district court had con-
sidered whether the plaintiff proved discrimination based on the evi-
dence as a whole.361 It found that the defendants’ stated reasons for fir-
ing the plaintiff were not the real reasons because other co-workers were 
not disciplined for more serious violations and the plaintiff was the only 
supervisor disciplined for actions of his subordinates.362 Nevertheless, it 
concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was discharged because of race.363 
 Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that when a de-
fendant’s explanation is found to be false, the plaintiff is entitled to 
JMOL.364 The plaintiff contended that if a defendant offers a false ex-
planation, it ought to be treated as if they had offered no explanation 
at all.365 The Court disagreed.366 The majority explained that the com-
bination of a prima facie case and disbelieving a defendant’s explana-
tion might “permit” a reasonable fact-finder to find discrimination, but 
this conclusion is not required and may not even be the only reason-
able conclusion.367 A reasonable fact-finder might also find the plaintiff 
failed to prove discrimination. The Court’s analysis thus provided one 
                                                                                                                      
358 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973). Under this 
proof structure, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. See St. Mary’s, 
509 U.S. at 506. Then, the defendant must produce a race-neutral explanation for its ac-
tions. See id. When the defendant provides an explanation, the jury will determine, based 
on the evidence as a whole, whether the plaintiff has proven discrimination by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. See id. 
359 509 U.S. at 506. 
360 Id. at 507. 
361 See id. at 508. 
362 See id. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 509. 
365 See St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 509–11. 
366 See id. 
367 Id. at 511. The Court further explained: “[W]hat is required to establish the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is infinitely less than what a directed verdict demands.” 
Id. at 515. 
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example of a conclusion that would not necessarily be unreasonable: 
finding no discrimination while disbelieving the defendant’s explana-
tion. But, the Court did not provide a general standard for determining 
when conclusions are reasonable or unreasonable based on the evi-
dence. 
 The theory of procedural accuracy provides this standard. A plain-
tiff is entitled to JMOL only when a reasonable jury must find the plain-
tiff’s explanation to be better than those that favor the defendant. Such 
a finding was not mandated in St. Mary’s because a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that (1) defendant’s explanation is false, and (2) 
plaintiff’s explanation is not better than other explanations that favor 
the defendant, such as that the plaintiff was fired for a reason other 
than discrimination. Fact-finders are free to reject explanations offered 
by parties and to develop alternative explanations. They ought to find 
for whomever these alternative explanations favor when such explana-
tions are better than the parties’ explanations.368 
 The theory of procedural accuracy explains the outcome in Reeves, a 
similar U.S. Supreme Court discrimination case decided in 2000.369 The 
plaintiff in Reeves brought an age discrimination lawsuit after his em-
ployer of forty years discharged him from his job as a supervisor in the 
employer’s manufacturing plant.370 The case proceeded to trial, and a 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.371 The defendant argued that 
plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient and that the defendant was entitled 
to JMOL.372 The primary issue before the Court was whether a plaintiff’s 
proof of a prima facie case plus evidence discrediting the defendant’s al-
ternative explanation is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimi-
nation.373 The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it will always 
be insufficient.374 The Court explained that sometimes it will be suffi-
cient to support a reasonable finding of discrimination, and sometimes it 
will not be.375 In this case, the Court concluded there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury’s verdict.376 Procedural accuracy explains 
                                                                                                                      
368 Additionally, fact-finders ought to find against the party with the burden of proof if 
they conclude this party’s explanation is equally as good as a third one that favors the 
other side. 
369 See 530 U.S. at 137. 
370 See id. at 137–38. 
371 Id. at 139. 
372 See id. at 148–49. 
373 See id. at 137. 
374 See id. at 148–49. 
375 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 
376 See id. at 151–53. 
1508 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1451 
Reeves. The decision was correct because in accepting the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case and rejecting the defendant’s explanation, a reasonable jury 
could find age to be the best available explanation for the discharge.377 
Conclusion 
 The procedural devices of pleadings, summary judgment, and 
JMOL rely on unclear standards, and this lack of clarity creates norma-
tive problems throughout the system of civil litigation. The unclear 
standards include whether a complaint is “plausible” and whether a 
“reasonable jury” could find for a party at trial. The normative prob-
lems include a lack of guidance and constraint on judicial determina-
tions and unprincipled applications of these devices to terminate po-
tentially meritorious lawsuits. 
 This Article argues that the theory of procedural accuracy ex-
plains, clarifies, and provides content to these standards (to resolve the 
descriptive problems), and it provides guidance and constraint for 
principled applications (to resolve normative problems). Descriptively, 
each device depends for its content on the underlying evidentiary 
proof rules that would apply at trial, and, thus, understanding what 
these rules require provides insight into the standards for each device. 
Relying on an explanatory conception of these rules, the standards for 
the procedural devices are explained in terms of competing explana-
tions of the evidence and events giving rise to litigation. Normatively, 
each device serves the procedural values that underlie the system of 
civil litigation by aligning outcomes with the requirements of the proof 
rules. These rules are designed to foster materially accurate outcomes 
and to fairly allocate the risk of adjudicative error among the parties. 
The procedural devices foster these goals by aligning outcomes with 
the rules. In addition to serving the important values of accuracy and 
the risk of error, the proposed standards fit in a justifiable manner with 
other important procedural values including efficiency, participation, 
jury-trial rights, substantive rights, deterrence, and guidance regarding 
the substantive law. 
 Lastly, the relationship between this Article’s descriptive and nor-
mative claims is explained. They are conceptually independent. In 
other words, one may accept the descriptive claims while rejecting the 
normative claims, and vice versa. Nonetheless, the theory of procedural 
accuracy provides the best explanation on both sets of issues. This then 
                                                                                                                      
377 This assumes that there is not other evidence in the record that shows some other 
non-discriminatory explanation is better, or at least as good as, plaintiff’s explanation. 
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generates a number of subsequent questions beyond the scope of this 
Article. For example, descriptively, more refined analysis will be needed 
on how to apply the standards and the underlying explanatory criteria 
to particular substantive areas of law; normatively, further analysis will 
be needed on how the alignment function and the values it fosters re-
late in detail to the other specific procedural values that help to com-
prise the complex web of normative considerations underlying the liti-
gation system as a whole. These are topics for another day. 
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